The OIG's Work Plan for 2013 was surprisingly light on issues that affect physicians. Although attention to specific diagnostic testing including sleep studies, high end imaging, and electrodiagnostic testing were called out for attention, there were four critical areas that include several concerns on which we have long provided guidance and one new problem particularly for physicians.
First, the OIG has identified compliance with the reassignment rules as meriting its attention. Reassignment is part of the much more highly restrictive rules and processes of enrollment and maintaining enrollment. We have written on this topic, repeatedly because we know there are real pitfalls here. (See Shay, "Potential problems exist in the Medicare enrollment process", Medical Economics (November 25, 2011), Shay, "Successfully navigating the Medicare enrollment appeals process", Medical Economics (November 10, 2011, Gosfield and Shay, “Medicare Enrollment: A Never-Ending High Hurdles Race ,” DermWorld (April, 2011) pp. 14-16. Gosfield, “Medicare Enrollment: A Tougher Road to Go ” ASNC (March-April 2011) p. 7. Shay, "'Halt! Who Goes There?': Coping with the Continuing Crackdown on Medicare Enrollment", HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK (2011 ed.) West Group. [Click here for draft ] We have a teleconference on the subject which was originally offered March 1, 2011 and is available as an MP3 with a handout.
The OIG will also be taking yet another look at physician billing for “incident to” services, one of the areas physicians must confront as they change their practice patterns to become more efficient, improve patient satisfaction and create better value for patients and payors, including Medicare. Failure to comply with the requirements of the “incident to” rules can lead to overpayments and potentially false claims. Physicians have been charged criminally on this issue and they have also faced civil false claims suits by the government. This is not a topic to trifle with.
In 2013, the OIG will look back to determine the extent to which CMS made potentially inappropriate payments for evaluation and management services. Here, the new concern is that with the advent of electronic health records, documentation using macros and other templates is driving toward increased utilization of higher level codes. There is real debate in the industry as to whether EHRs are permitting more accurate documentation and billing or whether some of the software packages drive towards upcoding. Finally, the OIG has identified place of service inconsistencies as another target for review, with primary attention to discrepancies between hospital claims and physician claims.
The value of the Work Plan is that it offers an early warning opportunity for providers, among others, to review their current practices with respect to the identified targets of review. Based on what it finds in the Work Plan, the OIG identifies suggested policy changes as well as potential topics for audit targets by the reams of investigators and auditors that the government now uses to enforce its increased fraud and abuse authorities. Forewarned is fore armed. Physicians should review their practices for all four topics.
The health reform legislation called on the Secretary of HHS to develop a pilot program under Medicare to evaluate bundled payment. The Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative has launched. The law says the pilot will last five years, must be budget neutral, and if the Secretary finds it to be beneficial to do so can be extended in time and scope. In other words, bundled payment could become mandatory for Medicare for categories of conditions, after 2017! Commercial payors are also experimenting with bundled payment, but with relatively tepid results. In "Bundled Payment: Avoiding Surprise Packages ", Alice explores what we know about bundled payment, bringing to bear her experience with the PROMETHEUS Payment® model which is the most sophisticated of these programs. She describes Medicare's previous experience with bundled payment and presents some of the methodological problems with the way the new program is unfolding. Following on her previous work on contractual and governance issues in bundled payment, she addresses those and also issues in payor-provider contracts. There are ways to avoid trouble in these transactions; and bundles for the sake of bundles alone are not worth experimenting with if the bundles are not designed properly. Caveat emptor!
All of the messages to physicians from the new health reform law and the market are that they need to improve the value of their performance in terms of efficiency and cost effectiveness, improved quality and patient-centricity and satisfaction. An obvious means to this is the deployment of less expensive clinical personnel to extend the physician's reach. In "Highest and Best Use Revisited" , Dan Shay picks up a topic last considered by Alice in 1999. He describes the new pressures for physicians to focus closely on when and how to use non-physician practitioners to deliver care. He explains Medicare's rules with particular attention to nurse practitioners and physician assistants and reports on the positive impact that proper use of these ancillary personnel can have on the new mandates for improved performance.
As more and more physicians become employed by health systems and hospitals, concerns are raised regarding how the employers may manipulate physician behavior based on the master-servant nature of employment. In light of those concerns, the AMA has issued Principles for Physician Employment The principles address conflicts of interest that can arise in employment relationships, contracting issues, the right to advocate, the separation of employment from the physician's status as a member of the organized medical staff, the need for peer review and approaches to performance evaluation, and transparency associate with payment by payors. The 26 individual principles provide a checklist for negotiations with potential employers, but they likely will not always be addressed in contracts. Moreover the principles offer some hope for independent physicians who seek to remain so but are worried that their referral base will erode as health systems require their employees to refer in network, so to speak. Those physicians who lose some of these referrals are often surprised to learn that the Stark regulations specifically permit the requirement of directed referrals under the personal services exception, the employment exception and the managed care exception. In other words, the policy antipathy toward self-referral in the physician world is not so honored in the health system and managed care world. We have long argued that the profound consolidation taking place right now is building powerful cartels often with no value proposition at all. We believe many of the hastily arranged transactions we have reviewed and advised on will not produce success for the employers or the employees. We take the position that clinical integration and alignment to produce value do not require employment.
As the health care system confronts the need for significant change to produce more value, observers note the factors that drive up health care costs. One such commentator, Julie Appleby, writing in Kaiser Health News identified 7 factors driving up health care costs. Francois de Brantes, the Executive Director of the Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute, Inc. (www.hci3.org), the board of which Alice chairs, recharacterized these as the Seven Deadly Sins of Rising Health Care Costs. They merit our attention. They include (1) Greed -- paying for volume rather than value; (2) Gluttony -- an increasingly unhealthy population; (3) Envy -- desire for new technologies and drugs; (3) Sloth -- tax breaks on insurance premiums; (5) Pride -- lack of transparent information; (6) Lust -- provider consolidation; and (7) Wrath -- legal and regulatory barriers to change. Most have had some attention paid to them in the health reform legislation. But contrary to the views of some on the far right who believe the law represents a vast government take over of healthcare, it is, in fact, quite the opposite. From the provider's perspective it is 1,000 pilots blooming in terms of real payment change. The fraud and abuse authorities do represent increasing wrath with respect to unnecessary expenditures. But providers -- and most particularly physicians -- are going to have to embrace the idea of changing themselves or they will be forced to change by others. Many of the issues we work on with our clients represent those kind of forward looking efforts, but, we think many more physicians need to be more pro-active about their futures.
With the questions about the health reform legislation's constitutionality resolved, the pace of change in the provider community has accelerated. In a well documented, sweeping review of physician practice developments, with special attention to how physicians can remain independent, Jeff Goldsmith in his very interesting commissioned paper for the Physicians' Foundation looks at significant trends. These include rising costs for physician practices, widespread retirement of baby boomer physicians in the near term, and the ways in which health policy gives preference to hospital employment, which likely is unsustainable in current forms. Looking at The Future of Medical Practice and The Need to Innovate he offers examples of approaches including micro-practices, well supported IPAs, and groups which take professional services risk payments, among other innovations. He offers policy recommendations for change. He makes the case that hospital employed physicians are vastly less productive than their private practice colleagues and their financial performance lags substantially as well. He posits that many of the current arrangements will be unsustainable. We have been making the same points since 2009 as well as more recently.
We would take issue with his views of innovative payment initiatives though, since he does not address the PROMETHEUS Payment® model which does not give physicians insurance risk, but rather risk to manage care effectively. Not only that, but its budgets (Evidence-informed Case Rates®) begin with good, clinical practice guidelines. Jeff's arguments regarding financing the medical home don't go as far as what we have described as to how PROMETHEUS Payment can sustain the medical home. Physicians today are paid fee for service for a non-insulin dependent diabetic about $311 for a year of care. Using the PROMETHEUS Payment model, the same physician would be paid for the same patient for the same year of care $2329 AND the system would save substantial amounts of money currently spent on potentially avoidable complications. Physicians should learn about this!!!
New payment models are only part of the innovations physicians will have to adopt. We now offer a suite of useful tools that can be deployed by physicians in shaping their own new futures including (1) our two versions of the clinical integration self-assessment tool -- one for networks and the other for group practices, organized medical staffs or newly coalescing ACO-type organizations ; (2) our Three Tuesday Teleconferences addressing leasing the practice, co-management, and bundled payments; (3) our teleconference on compensating physicians for quality and value as well as our articles on the subject. Physicians can be far more proactive in designing their futures. The moment is now.
Bundled payment has been touted as the next, new aligned incentive payment model. Although rarely defined in the many discussions about it, bundled payment by definition combines two different providers, typically traditionally paid differently, into one budget or, in more radical versions, subject to a single prospective payment. Today's bundled payment models usually include an episode based payment. The Medicare ACO program anticipates a bundled payment model in its requirement that participating entities have the ability to allocate dollars to the disparate participants. In fact, though, in that program hospitals, physicians and others will be paid on a business as usual basis, and then, at the end of three years, if they have saved money over a benchmark there will be one payment to share. PROMETHEUS Payment offers a different model. If providers want to be paid separately, they are at risk together in a single budget, but PROMETHEUS Payment has a software program that can allocate savings appropriately to the diverse participating providers, based on good clinical practice guidelines which form the basis for the case rate. The incentives are the same, but the payment methods differ. Many commercial bundled payment and ACO programs follow the Medicare model. Herein lies the rub. Unless there are clear rules at the outset, providers may end up in the rancorous fights that characterized the few instances in the 1990s when PHOs received dollars, usually held by the hospital. CMMI asked Alice to present a technical assistance webinar for potential participants in their Medicare Bundled Payment Initiative on contractual and governance issues among providers in administering bundled payment models, and in "Avoiding Food Fights: The Value of Good Drafting to ACO Physician Participants " she elucidates the types of policy decisions that should be made today and documented governance documents and contracts among providers to avoid the problems of tomorrow. The third of our Three Tuesday Teleconferences addresses many of these issues with an opportunity for participants to ask questions.
Although most of the health reform furor was about the individual mandate, we have repeatedly made the point that health reform gave new weapons to prosecutors of fraud and abuse, and the financial pressures of the new environment make fraud and abuse enforcement a major focus of the regulators and enforcers. When GlaxoSmithKline paid more than $3 billion to settle false claims charges for a variety of misbehaviors, the government also made it clear, once again, that they would go after individual executives who ignore or worse yet encourage violative behavior.. Many in the commercial sector do not understand that the government is on a cultural jihad about this. It is remarkable that over the last twenty years, as measured by Public Citizen, fully more than 25% of Federal False Claims Act recoveries have come from big pharma. The government has new weapons and new approaches. "We used to hunt like an elephant and now we chase like a cheetah" is the line a senior advisor for investigation has used. Alice authors a book which is updated every year titled Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse and the inexorable tightening of the enforcement snares is abundantly clear. What can regular providers do? As we have repeatedly recommended, now is the time to buff up your compliance program and if you don't have one it is imperative that you develop solid approaches to compliance. In "Compliance programs: more important now than ever " Alice and Dan explain why even though the law says having one is voluntary, those who don't adopt one, or merely pay lip service to the issue, do so at real peril. And, compliance is no longer just about false claims in billing. The OIG has announced its invigorated focus on patient safety, noting that one in four Medicare beneficiaries suffers an adverse event in the hospital, and that it will continue and increase its attention to adverse events, never events and temporary harm events. Based on these developments it is clear that a good compliance program will encompass proactive management of a range of liabilities we have identified including Stark with attention to internal compensation as well as referral relationships, anti-kickback issues, maintaining enrollment and, increasingly, quality reporting and quality performance issues as well.
We have been exhorting physicians to recognize this critical moment in health care history to change fundamental aspects of the way they deliver care in order to regain time and touch with their patients, as well as to position themselves to maximize their financial opportunities. There are a host of ways of doing this from clinical integration, to realigning with hospitals, to revitalizing the organized medical staff, to forming networks of independent physicians, and more. In a piece by a professor of radiology, pediatrics, medical education, philosophy, liberal arts, and philanthropy at Indiana University, where he also serves as vice chair of the Department of Radiology, analogizes medicine's challenges to A Cardiac Model for Resuscitating Health Care takes up the banner of physicians putting the heart back in medicine by leading these efforts. His analogies of corporate cardiopathy and practice heart failure make the point in a different way. A short article worth a read.
Between April and June, 2012, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sent out almost 12,000 revalidation requests, some to providers who may even have completed a revalidation in recent years. However, with the passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2009, any Medicare provider who enrolled prior to March 25, 2011 is subject to a revalidation request between now and March 23, 2015. For those who have yet to undergo it, revalidation is the process by which CMS re-credentials providers who have Medicare billing privileges. The revalidation process is akin to “re-enrolling” under the newer, more stringent screening process put in place in February, 2011, requiring that providers complete a full CMS-855 application. Revalidation, like initial applications and updates, is a time-consuming, detail-oriented process which implicates providers’ billing privileges, so providers should be especially careful in responding to a revalidation request. Enrollment and revalidation are significant challenges. As we have said in teleconferences, and multiple articles [November 10 and November 25 Medical Economics articles, DermWorld article from April 2011, ASNC articles March-April 2011 , and 2011 Health Law Handbook article ], this is a major challenge, especially for physicians, that demands focused attention.
On June 26, 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") released the audit protocols it is using in auditing covered entities under HIPAA, which is relevant to increased enforcement of the privacy rules. The information, located here, includes audit protocols for both the Security Rule and the Privacy Rule (including the Breach Notification provisions), broken down by Federal Regulation section. For example, when auditing covered entities with respect to their use of de-identified information, auditors are instructed to ask the covered entity’s management team whether a policy or procedure exists to de-identify protected health information, to review such policies and procedures in relation to regulatory criteria, and to verify that they are updated and presented to the covered entity’s workforce. This release provides insight into the OCR’s concerns regarding HIPAA and can assist covered entities in developing their own HIPAA compliance programs. Since even small physician practices have been subjects of enforcement, compliance with the privacy and security rules (See our teleconference - "When PHI Escapes") is yet a new imperative.
As health reform unfolds for the public payment programs, and commercial payors get on the value bandwagon too, it is increasingly clear that the role of physicians in making change happen will be paramount. Although there is much that hospitals can do on their own to improve quality, patient safety and value, none of the promise of health reform will be met without the enthusiastic involvement of physicians. Why physicians deserve special attention and most importantly what they can do to help themselves, has been an increasing focus of Alice's writing and speaking. From a six minute YouTube excerpt of a presentation to the Pennsylvania Medical Society leadership to an hour YouTube clip of a presentation to the Texas Medical Association, she makes the point that the moment for physicians to step up and organize themselves for better performance and better results is now. Her editorials in Maryland Medicine and Medical Economics exhort physicians to recognize their unique role and unique responsibilities.
As the health care delivery system is reconfiguring, many physicians have sought employment by hospitals as a life preserver in uncertain times. At the same time, traveling throughout the country, Alice has seen that there are a multitude of physicians who have no desire to be employed, but while remaining independent, also are coming to understand that they will have to clinically integrate with other like minded physicians, if they are to be successful in demonstrating real value in their care delivery. The Clinical Integration Self-Assessment Tool v 2.0 (CISAT) is oriented toward employed physicians – whether in their own groups or by hospitals – on one hand, or in the more hospital-centric settings of the organized medical staff or a newly forming ACO-like entity, on the other. Now in CISAT v 2.1 , we have a self-assessment tool for groups of otherwise independent physicians to use in coming together to meet the clinical integration demands of the new environment. Designed to help them envision what a desired end state, or at least more evolved organization, might look like, as with v.2.0, it provides three scenarios for each of the 17 attributes of a clinically integrated entity from barely started, to making some headway, to more evolved. We hope physicians find it helpful in repositioning themselves for new challenges.
Now that the interim final Medicare ACO regulations have been published, and the first Pioneer ACOs announced, much of the furor over who will move to be an ACO should begin to subside. The regulations, while an improvement over the proposed regulations still describe a complex, infrastructure-intense, highly detailed set of requirements, with much of the potential reward still speculative. Alice has long been skeptical of the ideas embedded in the legislation. In many ways a more interesting opportunity has been presented by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) in its call for proposals to be a bundled payment pilot. Here, CMMI has provided four models for providers and 'conveners' to experiment with different models of bundled payment, with the proposers given the flexibility to define their own episodes of care around which payment would be bundled. The thirty day post discharge model is for physicians to prevent readmissions. There is a model for integrated systems. One for hospitals alone, and one which very much reflects the PROMETHEUS Payment approach. In "Here's how to participate in CMMI's bundled payment pilot" (Sept 2011). Alice describes some of the practical implications and legal issues associated with pursuing this opportunity. These projects will be worth watching.
The health reform legislation has put a firm stake in the ground with respect to expanding the measurement of quality for many providers. One of its principle vehicles was to solidify the former Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI) into a Congressionally mandated Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS). Although what is reported has nothing to do with whether either quality standards were met or quality itself improved, with the financial incentives available to those who report voluntarily, the idea is that physicians will learn to report quality effectively. By 2015, physicians who do not report will be penalized. In "PQRS and Its Penumbra ", Dan Shay explores the implications of the program, how it relates to meaningful use financial incentives and the pitfalls, including false claims liability, that lurk in ineffective reporting. This program is a must know for physicians.
In 2007, Alice conducted a unique survey of the extent to which physician groups compensated their employed physicians for quality. As physicians consider deploying a range of strategies to enhance their performance, a new snapshot of the state of the art of compensating physicians seemed a worthwhile undertaking. Again, with the assistance of the American Medical Group Association (AMGA) Alice surveyed their membership. In "Compensating Physicians for Quality and Value: A Changing Landscape ", she provides an initial report on the responses which came from three times as many organizations as four years earlier. In 2008, in her longer Health Law Handbook chapter, Alice described the advent of Pay for Performance programs as the primary stimulus to these compensation models. Now, in
"Bolstering Change: Physician Compensation for Quality and Value "she looks at the phenomenon of compensating physicians for quality performance and increasingly for value in cost effective approaches to care. In addition to setting the issue of physician compensation in the current enhanced value context, Alice also looks at data on how hospitals are dealing with their employed physicians on this front, and concludes that much like her observations with Jim Reinertsen of those hospital employment/integration strategies without content, she finds that many hospitals are missing a real alignment opportunity by focusing solely on wRVUs in compensating their employed physicians. And, more and more, attention will have to be paid to the cost effectiveness of physician behavior which drives the group's or hospital's revenues.
Medicare’s “PhysicianCompare” website has been live since December 30, 2010, offering the public a database of physicians and non-physician practitioners (NPPs) who participate in Medicare, searchable by specialty, location, and last name. The website also shows whether a physician or NPP accepts Medicare assignment, and whether they participated successfully in the 2009 Physician Quality Reporting Initiative. By 2013 the site will begin reporting quality performance information. However, some physicians are finding that their own entries on the website contain errors. The PhysicianCompare website populates its database with information drawn from Medicare’s Physician Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System (PECOS) – the electronic Medicare enrollment website. This represents a golden opportunity for physicians and physician groups to check whether their enrollment information is up-to-date. If a physician notes a discrepancy in the information, or if information is missing, that physician should submit a revised enrollment application as soon as possible. Errors such as missing practice locations, physicians who have not worked for a practice for years listed as practice members, and unlisted current members may be spotted on the Physician Compare site before they become a problem and in time to be corrected.
As we have noted before, Medicare’s focus on keeping bad actors out of the program has made the enrollment process fraught with peril. Minor errors in completing forms, misunderstanding who is a managing employee and who is a delegated official can stymie those who seek to update their information or now are required to under Medicare’s revalidation program. All Medicare providers will have to revalidate by March 23, 2013. This means verifying all enrollment data. It is essentially filing a new application for enrollment. Only those who have revalidated since March 23, 2011 will be exempt. New regulations as a result of health reform have designated various types of providers in terms of the risk they pose to the program. DME and home health agencies are at the highest level of risk and new applicants are already subject to criminal background checks. IDTFs and physical therapists are a second level of risk. Physician practices are at the lowest level of risk, but IDTFs owned by physicians are treated as IDTFs generally with no preferences or favorable presumptions because they are owned by physicians. In “Medicare Enrollment: A Never Ending High Hurdles Race ”, we explain further the practical implications of these processes.
We have reported the increasing focus of the OIG on quality issues as a matter of fraud and abuse. (See Issues: # 7, #55, #56). In addition, with the advent of many more quality reporting programs and more to come, risks associated with quality reporting-based false claims are also increasing. (See also Issues #63, #64) demonstrating the major emphasis the OIG is now placing on this aspect of its amped up enforcement efforts, the OIG has created a separate web page for Corporate Integrity Agreements that entail quality of care issues. For those who have naysayed our warnings, the writing is on the wall. Everyone should be including these types of issues in their compliance programs, and in the current environment, no provider should be functioning without a meaningful, operational compliance program.
As the concept has unfolded from an article in Health Affairs in December 2006, we have expressed skepticism about the implementation of Medicare Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). The proposed regulations were met with resounding criticism throughout the industry from almost all sides; and the supporting statements, by the Federal Trade Commission on antitrust and the OIG on fraud and abuse, derided both as too restrictive and too lenient. Many forget that this program enacted as part of health reform was never intended to be applicable to most provider groups. At its best, CMS has estimated that 75-100 provider entities will be approved as ACOs.
We firmly believe this is a considerable over-estimate even if there is a complete revamping of the regulations. We are not alone. In “Onerous Regs Put ACOs on the Ropes” Alice and Jeff Goldsmith are the principal interviewees explaining why of the 5800 hospitals and more than 780,000 physicians in America, very few will find themselves in Medicare ACOs. That said, the pressures to be accountable for care and what that will require are an entirely different proposition. In “ACOs vs. Accountable Care: Is There A Difference?”, Alice further describes the problems with the Medicare approach, but elucidates the essential activities that are necessary to be accountable for care; and they are activities that providers should be engaged in even if no one pays them differently.
Clinical integration has increasingly been discussed as the vehicle to accomplish what is necessary to be accountable for care. But even among those commentators who have gotten beyond the antitrust notions of clinical integration, few really describe the focus of change that can create a truly clinically integrated environment, nor how those changes can make a difference. For some time now, we have touted clinical integration as a way to reorganize clinical and administrative processes of care, particularly among physicians and the other clinicians who work with them, but also in relationship to hospitals. (See issues: #70, #67, #60) Now, Alice and Jim Reinertsen MD, have created a Clinical Integration Self Assessment tool which elucidates 17 distinct attributes of clinically integrated programs, whether within a physician group, by a hospital with its newly employed physicians, within the organized medical staff, or in a newly coalescing ACO-like entity. All ought to take into account the range of issues identified, but in slightly different ways. We are also explicitly calling for those who may use the tool, to revise, refine and add to it.
In her article in Medical Economics “Making Clinical Integration Work” Alice focuses on how clinical integration is meaningful to small physician practices. In their brief piece for the Health Forum, “Clinical Integration: Getting From Here to There ” Alice and Jim Reinertsen focus on the hospital-physician nexus of clinical integration. Clinical integration of various kinds is going to be the sine qua non of health care delivery which will succeed in an environment of heightened quality expectations, the need for better patient safety, diminishing reimbursement, and pressure for contained costs.
From its creation by a pro bono inter-disciplinary group of health care experts, many have looked at the PROMETHEUS Payment® model as some theoretical construct of payment. This would be wrong. Pilot implementations under a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant have offered practical lessons in using the program on the ground. New pilot programs in Colorado, New York and elsewhere are providing new lessons. In “Transitioning to Value: PROMETHEUS Payment Pilot Lessons ”, some of the pilot sites discuss what they experienced in implementing the program in diverse settings. PROMETHEUS Payment now has toolkits to help those in the field apply what has been learned. It can be used in any setting with a willing health plan and willing providers, but the PROMETHEUS analytics can also be used without full deployment of the payment model, to find Potentially Avoidable Complications in any claims database, which can give hospitals and physicians actionable information on which to improve care and value. This is real.
Hospital employment of physicians is occurring all over the country. Much of it is comes from completely misguided expectations. There are delusions and fantasies on both sides of these transactions. Physicians hurl themselves on the bosom of the hospital in the belief this will give them financial security while they will be left alone to practice, business as usual. Hospitals, for their part, think this will give them control over physicians, but they rarely do anything with them, particularly the specialists who have recently joined their fold. Many of the finances of these deals cannot work going forward as hospitals confront decreased reimbursement from Medicare and fewer admissions in a quality driven environment. We have confronted these issues before in articles addressing non-acquisition financial strategies between hospitals and physicians and on the right questions to ask and answer before leaping into these arrangements. We fully expect there to be unwinds of many of those transactions which are without content, given physician gripes about employment. That said, these arrangements can work. But the mere existence of a W-2 between the health system or hospital and the physician is not a viable, sustainable approach. Strategic goals, clear targets and benchmarks of behavior from both sides of the table are the only reasonable way for these transactions to add any real value in the changing system.
The health reform legislation provides an unprecedented emphasis on quality measurement, quality improvement, efficiency and value. Value is improved quality at lower cost. For providers, changing their clinical processes to meet these new demands will be essential. Both hospitals and physicians will be facing Medicare value-based modifiers beginning in 2012. Hospitals will further face reductions in payment for avoidable readmissions as well as for hospital-acquired conditions. Because the two payment modifiers for hospitals and physicians, although separate, will be coordinated, this generates an extraordinary motivation for hospitals and physicians to work together. In “The New Value on Provider ‘Value'” Alice elucidates the many aspects of health reform that reflect these new mandates. She looks at the restrictions Congress has placed on the ability to use cost in comparative effectiveness analysis as an example of a failure of public policy.
The new environment makes it abundantly clear that physician engagement with hospitals will be essential to their ability to produce value. At the same time, physicians themselves will have to find new ways to clinically integrate within their own groups. Hospitals which have now moved significantly into the physician employment arena will have to figure out what to do with their physicians. In their new paper, “Achieving Clinical Integration with Highly Engaged Physicians ”Alice Gosfield and Jim Reinertsen elucidate the new basis for common cause, contrast the current environment with past clinical integration efforts, and offer a new definition of clinical integration
“Physicians working together, systematically, with or without other organizations and professionals, to improve their collective ability to deliver high quality, safe, and valued care to their patients and communities.”
We offer four vibrant examples of very different programs where self-motivated physicians have clinically integrated. We reflect on the ways in which the organized medical staff can actually support and bolster clinical integration; and we introduce a new framework – the Four Fs – to help structure organized thinking about re-visioning the mission of the healthcare enterprise. This paper is a significant resource to our new program of the same title for the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, “Achieving Clinical Integration with Highly Engaged Physicians”. In the last analysis, this is an optimal moment for physicians to step up and take a leadership stance to improve care.
The requirements of the Joint Commission Medical Staff Standard 01.01.01 has created quite a furor in some corners. The standards focus on communication and adequate representation by the Medical Executive Committee of the voting members of the medical staff. By giving medical staff members the ability to propose amendments to the bylaws directly to the Board of Directors, the Joint Commission has taken a stand with respect to those unfortunate circumstances where Medical Executive Committees and the members of the medical staff which they represent, find themselves in conflict. Although many lawyers have overblown reactions to these changes, many hospitals and medical staffs are taking this moment of transition to think more explicitly about the role the organized medical staff can play in the new world order of measurement, transparency, value-based payment and clinical integration. Because the medical staff has no reason to exist other than in its support to the Board by advising it on ensuring the quality of care in the hospital, the standards, the culture, and the processes by which this will be accomplished have new momentum. The role of physicians in defining the quality culture of a hospital cannot be overstated. We are working with medical staffs around the country to revitalize their bylaws and their view of themselves. Physicians can not be engaged with each other unless they meet with each other, so some organizations are changing their meeting requirements to a more traditional expectation that physicians appear at meetings. Of course, since time is the scarcest resource physicians have available, to get them to spend time working with the hospital, the work must be meaningful to them. We have long taken the position that the best approach to engagement is to engage in the physicians’ quality agenda . We think that the moment to revitalize the medical staff is even stronger than it has been. We do not share the views of those who see the organized medical staff as obsolete.
Among the very significant fraud and abuse changes in the health reform legislation, Congress made it clear that they expect the regulators to keep bad actors out of Medicare. One of the techniques they will use to do this is the revamped and bolstered Medicare enrollment process. In his new consideration of these issues, “‘Halt! Who Goes There?’: Coping with the Continuing Crackdown on Medicare Enrollment, ” Daniel Shay elucidates the new rules, explains their practical implications, and then reviews 18 months worth of Administrative Law Judge opinions dealing with appeals of enrollment denials. However, the challenge is not merely getting in the front door, but maintaining enrollment, and the administrative burdens have grown exponentially. This is a burgeoning area that all providers need to pay attention to.
The Stark statute continues to confound physicians and those who do business with them with its complexity, draconian impacts, and complicated interrelationships with reimbursement rules such as antimarkup and the like. Imaging is an increasing focus of the fraud enforcers. It is not true that all those who engage in imaging services, including radiologists, are exempt from Stark. In a piece written especially for the American Society for Nuclear Cardiology, “Legal Update: Myths about Stark ” Alice very briefly sets forth some of the persistent myths pertaining to this law.
In July 2010, we sent letters to our physician clients and our hospital and medical staff clients urging them to take specific steps to meet the challenges of health reform before the value-based modifiers are implemented in 2012. By then, if you haven’t made serious change, it will be too late to succeed in the early going. These steps remain viable and worthwhile.
Clinical integration has been a vaguely understood
topic since the antitrust regulators introduced the concept
in 1996.
In follow up to our teleconference,
Alice continues her focus on this issue in a new article which
includes how clinical integration within groups may be an important
first step before clinical integration with competitors or with
hospitals. In “Clinical
Integration: it’s back again” she observes that the furtherance of clinical collaboration across
the continuum of care will be essential
to improve healthcare delivery. A broader understanding of clinical
integration techniques can enhance physician performance and quality
results both with hospitals and on their own.
As the healthcare industry
has become more complex and more regulated, the role of health lawyers
has become even more important. But, as
originally expounded in her teleconference
for the Reinertsen Group (Alice has taken
this issue further in a direct and hard hitting article for trustees
on how to assess their lawyer’s
judgment. In “How
To Listen To Your Lawyer” ,
she offers practical guidance for lay trustees of hospitals, but
her
insight and advice is applicable to healthcare executives, managers,
and physicians who don’t really understand what to make of
their lawyer’s advice, especially when the lawyer says “You
can’t do that.”
The PROMETHEUS Payment® model has been evaluated by RAND researchers
in the New
England Journal of Medicine
to be the only new payment reform approach that actually has the
potential to improve quality and save money. Many have wondered what
the contracting model would look like for the relationship between
plans and providers to make PROMETHEUS Payment® possible. Now,
Alice has created a contract template which is described in a PowerPoint
and recording she did for PROMETHEUS Payment® pilot sites which
makes it clear that it is not necessary to re-contract the network.
Simple amendments can accomplish the task. That said, there are elements
of ordinary managed care contracts which would have to be suspended
for the PROMETHEUS Payment® model to work.
As the concept of “Accountable
Care Organizations”
and moving to “The Clinic Model” have captured
the fancies of a number of small and large hospital systems around
the country, Alice with Jim
Reinertsen, MD explores the real questions that should
be asked and answered before health systems and physicians leap into
these
often ill-defined strategies.
In their piece “Informed
Consent to the Ties That Bind” ,
Alice and Jim describe specific points of evaluation, and offer good
and bad answers to the tough questions. They raise issues that few
of the consultants pushing these strategies are willing to address.
While specialists are seeking employment by health systems, health
systems are forming multi-specialty groups and the billiard balls
are repositioning themselves throughout the country, the illusion
that health system employment of physicians will solve alignment
problems going forward is unfortunately far too simplistic for the
current state of affairs. In her new HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK chapter, “Avoiding
Marriage: Hospital and Physician Non-Acquisition Financial Strategies” Alice
examines these issues in greater depth than was presented in her teleconference.
She explores the phenomenon of enthusiasm for full merger business
strategies and offers a range of other techniques
by which physicians and hospitals may bond more tightly while physicians
remain independent---all with particular emphasis on improving healthcare
value and quality.
In his new chapter for the 2010 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK,
Dan Shay explores the rapidly intensifying issues associated with
significantly increased
quality reporting. We now have evidence that
where the stakes for reporting go up, bad behavior will arise “Physician
and Hospital Quality Reporting Fraud: Risks and Compliance Techniques”
looks at the diverse range of quality reports required of hospitals,
health systems, and physicians. The fact of express and implied statements
about quality can create false claims and other types of fraud. He
suggests techniques in association with a formal compliance program
by which risks might be avoided.
Alice Gosfield has been a Key
Author for West Group
since 1989. In addition to the HEALTH
LAW HANDBOOK,
which is a new book every year, she also has revised and revamped
MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE
which is updated every year. It includes a chapter on investigations
by Kevin
Raphael.
Now, in an interview
with the publishers, she describes her entry into health law, her
views of its future, and her current work on the PROMETHEUS Payment® model.
The fraud enforcement armamentarium is growing. Congress
has put more weapons in the hands of enforcers and has opened new
pathways
for whistleblowers in
the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009. This law expands who
is subject to false claims liability and changes the knowledge standard.
Of potentially greater significance, it turns failure to repay
an overpayment
into a false claim. In her teleconference “Que
FERA FERA: The Need for Updated Compliance Programs” Alice
explains the law, elucidates its special significance for Stark law violations
and offers practical guidance
to buff up compliance programs to meet these very significant new challenges.
Reporting quality
performance is part of the Medicare move toward improved
quality and better transparency.
As the stakes for reporting increase with higher financial
penalties
for failure to report (see issues: #56, #61, #62)
as well as for bad results,
the likelihood for fraud associated
with
those quality reports go up. This potential has now been realized
where a physician altered
medical records of hospital patients after
they were discharged.
These are hospital self-reported measures which drive scoring for
hospitals to be listed on the CMS
website Hospital
Compare.
The hospital discovered and revealed the problem itself, but this
type of behavior highlights the need to include quality reporting
of many kinds in the compliance program for the hospital as well
as in compliance programs of physicians reporting for pay for performance
and PQRI payments.
“Incident to” principles in Medicare
have confused providers for years and
have confounded regulators. This topic has
appeared repeatedly in the OIG’s Work Plans, but efforts
to revise the rules have failed to come to fruition. Now the OIG
has
finally issued a report criticizing the “Prevalence
and Qualifications of Nonphysicians Who Performed Medicare Physician
Services”. It has always
been the case that for payment of any personnel under Medicare you
must first comply with state law. But this report chastises the fact
that many state laws permit physicians to delegate tasks to non-licensed
individuals whom they supervise. As long as that relationship complied
with the ‘incident to’ standards which require that a
physician be on premises while the personnel render services in a
course of treatment directed by the physician, such delegation is
consistent with Medicare law. The OIG was not amused. “Nonphysicians
performed almost two-thirds of the invasive services that Medicare
allowed the physicians. An invasive procedure involves entry into
the living body (as by incision or by insertion of an instrument).
Nonphysicians performed almost half of the noninvasive services that
Medicare allowed the physicians. Unqualified nonphysicians performed
21 percent of the services that physicians did not perform personally.” These
nonphysicians did not possess the necessary licenses or certifications,
had no verifiable credentials, or lacked the training to perform
the service. It is unclear how the OIG came to these conclusions,
but they recommend that everyone be compliant with state law (hard
to argue), that incident to services be identified by a modifier
(this has been done before) or that physicians be required to perform
all services requiring licensure (this will bring medical practice
to a halt). That said, we can expect in the current environment of
pressure to save money in the program that ‘incident to’ services
will become a target. Physicians are well advised to revisit their
use of ancillary personnel under state law and the Medicare program
rules.
When Medicare announced its program to not pay hospitals
for ‘never events’ it
was not at all clear how that would affect physician payment. Now
CMS has
published a Transmittal
announcing that for at least three of the conditions, there will
be no payment to physicians for these quality failures either.
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) first got play as an idea
in December 2006, in an article in Health Affairs by Elliot Fisher
of the Dartmouth-Atlas (and colleagues) -- “Creating
Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Medical Staff”.
The original idea was that hospitals should be measured for the performance
of their physicians, including those who never admit and never attend
there. How hospitals were to get access to what those physicians
were doing, or how they were to influence their behavior was unclear,
but the basic idea was that there is a continuum of care to which
physicians and hospitals contribute, and it is worth measuring the
results of their connections, even if the only connection is referral.
This was really part of a larger discussion in multiple articles
in a themed issue of Health Affairs, about the demise
of the organized medical staff, criticized by multiple commentators
as a moribund, obsolete institution. By January 2009,
in “Fostering
Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare”,
Dr. Fisher and colleagues, now including Mark McClellan, formerly
chief of CMS, were focused more on how these organizations or arrangements
could create shared savings for hospitals and physicians, while they
were being held accountable. As more skepticism was expressed regardi
ng the likelihood that these organizations would be widely implemented,
six months later, in “Achieving
Health Care Reform: How Doctors Can Help”,
Dr. Fisher joined with Don Berwick of the Institute for Healthcare
Improvement and Karen Davis of the Commonwealth Fund, to declare,
among other things, that these might be virtual organizations and
which would help slow spending growth.
There were still plenty of questions about what these things might
be since some had cited organizations such as the Mayo Clinic as
an ACO, while others referenced the regional health information
organization in Grand Junction, CO as an ACO, while still others
cited Geisinger
which is not only a provider system but has its own health plan.
Those are three very different kinds of entities. As the health
reform debates intensified, the debate between proponents and
critics of
ACOs also peaked. Jeff Goldsmith called them “Not
Ready for Prime Time”
since the basic idea of setting a budget for a community of care
clustered around a hospital, didn’t work in the early 1990s
and won’t now. McClellan and McKethan defended the idea as
essential to Medicare’s moving away from volume-driven care,
citing examples of fully
integrated delivery systems. The
following quote is their best cut at an explanation of this fast
morphing concept: “Accountable care organizations (ACOs)
are provider collaborations that integrate groups of physicians,
hospitals, and other providers around the ability to receive shared-savings
bonuses by achieving measured quality targets and demonstrating
real reductions in overall spending growth for a defined population
of
patients. ACOs can be organized in a number of provider configurations
with different payer participants. They can also feature different
payment incentives ranging from “one-sided” shared
savings within a fee-for-service environment, to a range of limited
or substantial
capitation arrangements with quality bonuses.” Sounds to
me like a super-duper-gainsharing-PHO, but bigger. Been there.
Done
that. Watched the squabbles over money between hospitals and physicians,
not to mention primaries and specialists. But wait, yet another
new study on “How
To Create Accountable Care Organizations”,
puts all the emphasis on primary care, with hospitals as a secondary
focus, moving to community-based measured care. Clearly the concept
is in flux and really isn’t about organizations at all, but
approaches to delivery of care. That’s what I get at this
point. If this concept survives the legislative debates, one can
only hope
that at most it is yet another in the plethora of pilots of the
new, new thing which Congress wants to try and not mandated. Experimentation
is good. Required reorganization is not.
The improvement of quality throughout the United States continues
to be a major part of the health care debates, along with better
control of costs and waste. In that context, clinical integration
has re-emerged as a mechanism to achieve these dual results. This
is interesting since many believe that the goal of clinical integration
is for providers to negotiate higher fees with payors. This is because
the concept emerged as part of the antitrust safety zones published
by the FTC and Department of Justice in 1996. There have been many
settlements [see links #6 (4 and 5)]
where the FTC said, “This
might have been OK if you’d been clinically integrated.” The
concept has been further clarified by its principal author [see links
#6, 7 and 22)
but it has not been described frequently in the literature. In part
this is because the utility of clinical integration
to facilitate better, more efficient care has been barely explained
by antitrust lawyers, who do not live in the world of quality improvement.
Clinical
Integration: It’s Not About Antitrust is our teleconference
describing the advent of clinical integration, the context for it,
what it means, and how to do it.
While there is a role for antitrust lawyers where otherwise competing
providers come together to negotiate for fees, the concept of clinical
integration is very similar to the principles set forth at www.uft-a.com,
and is applicable within physician practice groups. Moreover, it
is probably essential for groups to look at the extent to which they
have deployed these principles within their groups before they go
looking to affiliate with others. Still, to come together around
quality even if no one pays you differently is more and more critical
as physician groups feel the pressure to improve their financial
margins as well as their quality performance.
Many providers are skeptical that the government really
enforces the Stark statute. In a first
of its kind settlement, Covenant
Medical
Center in Iowa agreed to pay the government
$4.5 million to resolve false claims act allegations originally lodged
by competitors of the physicians the Medical Center had recruited
and to whom they were paying extremely high salaries as employees.
The really unusual aspects of the settlement were that it was with
the Department of Justice which cited the Stark statute violations
as the basis for the settlement because the salaries were the highest
in Iowa and among the highest in the United States for physicians.
The US Attorney has refused to reveal what he used to determine fair
market value but he did not cite MGMA compensation data as the basis
for the determination. The Stark statute requires fair market value
for a bona fide employment relationship compensation to qualify under
the exception.
From clinical integration,
to accountable care organizations, to significantly increased attention
to fraud and abuse, there is a lot of volatility afoot. Yet, there
are laws on the books including Stark and the antikickback statute,
which have the ability to impede true change. At the same time, there
are many who over interpret these laws and do not undertake initiatives
that they could.
In June 2009, at a ninety minute session at the American Health
Lawyers Association Annual Meeting, at the request of Lewis Morris,
Chief Legal Counsel for the OIG, and Vicky Robinson, his deputy,
I joined them in a discussion of innovation in healthcare in light
of program integrity demands. This was their idea, and an effort
to confront what Lew calls ‘the Goldilocks paradox” ---
how to find the balance between enforcing the laws on the books to
protect the public programs, but without stifling innovation and
improvement. I can now make this presentation available for free
as an MP3 recording that you can access from my website. www.gosfield.com
We do require that you register
to listen to the discussion. They present their
philosophy of enforcement and we discuss very specific, innovative
techniques – like hospitals paying
physicians for quality results, clinical integration, physician compensation
for quality within groups and much more. Lew and Vicky deserve real
credit for being so open and receptive in these discussions. I was
honored that they asked me to be the voice of the industry with them.
We had fun doing it and I think it is highly substantive. My thanks
to the Health Lawyers, which for thirty-five years of my career has
provided me more value for my professional dollar than any other
dues I pay. For those of you who are not lawyers, you need not be
one to either join the organization, make use of their resources,
or buy their materials. For the entire 2009
Annual Meeting program which had other
great presentations For other publications.
Lawyers offer
special expertise which health care providers need in order to function
in their highly
regulated contexts. In addition, the special liability problems faced
by those providers who do not meet the standard of care, merit careful
attention to risk management. But increasingly, we see hospitals
who are held captive by attorneys who needlessly scare them about
compliance and liability risk. There are increasing tensions in this
regard in the new world of quality transparency. We see lawyers advising
physicians in so restrictive a way as to impinge on their ability
to function as business entities. We see lawyers who over-estimate
the nature of compliance problems and recommend potentially more
risky efforts to fix them. After 35 years of working in this area,
Alice can say, without limitation, that older lawyers offer more
seasoned and reasoned advice than younger ones. Young lawyers get
hysterical and rigid about things which do not merit such anxiety.
In addition, too many lawyers of all ages over-control the situation
where, mostly, the risks are purely the client’s to take.
On the other hand, it is not well understood that lawyers
advising health care providers, and particularly boards of trustees,
have personal liability, not only for what they do, but increasingly
for what their clients do. This cannot help but influence the way
they give advice. Still further, the context for the relationship
between attorney and client can also color the way advice is given.
What is the lawyer’s liability and how do we take that into
account? Does a member of the law firm sit on the board of the hospital?
How important are we as a client to the firm advising us? How does
that affect what we are hearing from them? How did the in-house counsel
pick the attorney she is recommending for a technical issue? What
kinds of information should clients ask to assess the advice they
are getting? Finally, are there certain kinds of issues on which
the lawyer should be taken more seriously than others? These matters
are never discussed openly – at the board, between the client
and attorney, or by attorneys themselves. Alice is taking this issue
on in a new webinar that addresses “When
Should You Listen to Your Lawyer?” Aimed at hospital trustees,
the issues she poses are relevant to all clients in the health care
industry.
For the 2008 Medicare
Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS), Medicare published rules with regard
to the prohibition on marking up diagnostic testing which became
effective January 1, 2008. On January 3, they were ‘suspended’ until
the end of the year. With the 2009 MPFS, they were republished in
final form offering two tests as to whether the prohibition is applicable:
(1) whether the supervising or interpreting physician spends 75%
of his time with the group; and if so, then there are no further
restrictions to consider; if he does not then (2) whether the location
where the service is provided is co-located with the office of the ordering
physician, where that physician provides substantially the full
range of his services on a regular basis. This is more restrictive
than Stark; and it applies to all diagnostic testing, not just Stark
DHS. Stark is about whether the service can be provided and be covered
by Medicare. The anti-markup rules are about how much the billing
entity can charge. The calculation of the ‘net charge’ when
the prohibition does apply, if not obtained on a ‘per transaction’, ‘per
click’ or ‘per study’ basis, is metaphysical at
best. These rules relate to, although were not published with, the
rules under Stark on “under arrangements” which also
now extend far beyond the traditional hospital setting to all arrangements
where a physician owned entity furnishes DHS to another entity which
bills the DHS to Medicare --- most particularly, but not exclusively,
hospitals. Rather than an AGG Note, for these developments
Alice has used a teleconference addressing “Anti-Markup
and Under Arrangements: Stark Beyond Stark” which
can be purchased as an MP3 recording to listen to at your leisure,
along with the handout which was distributed to conference attendees.
CMS has been tinkering with
the Medicare enrollment process for
years. As part of the increasing fraud and abuse prevention arsenal,
the theory has been that if they gather more information
at the outset, they will be able to weed out ‘bad actors’ from
obtaining access to Medicare dollars. As a result, the burdens in
applying have multiplied; and now they have severely limited the
ability to reach back in time to bill retroactively for claims which
have accumulated pending approved enrollment. Worse yet are the burdens
on already approved providers to update Medicare when there are changes
in various aspects of their operations, ownership and more. Some
of the rules are confusing. You don’t have to tell them that
you employ physician assistants when you enroll, but you must notify
Medicare if you terminate a PA! In his chapter in the 2009 HEALTH
LAW HANDBOOK , “Enrollment
in Medicare: Fraternity Hazing or Keeping Out Bad Actors? ” Dan
Shay examines the history of the process, basic requirements, penalties
and appeals, and then, with specific attention to physician practices,
he sets forth a range of common scenarios where there are reporting
pitfalls lurking for groups which do not understand these increasingly
burdensome rules.
In 2006, Congress enacted the very
beginnings of a physician
quality payment program.
Too timid to actually pay physicians for better quality results,
the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI)
is not even a pay for performance program, but a pay for reporting
program.
The actual quality of the care delivered does not matter. In essence
it is the Physician Whatever Reporting Initiative. The number of
measures to be reported has grown significantly. Many who reported
in 2007 found that they did not get the proffered 1.5% bonus payment.
CMS itself reports that little more than half of those who reported
first received bonuses. The average payment was $600 per provider
and $4,700 per physician. For 2009 the number of measures increased
yet
again. While this increases the chance to say something to get more
money, the real problem is that it is not about quality, and only
adds to the administrative burdens with which physicians are already
struggling.
Under the Stark statute and
regulations, there are significant restrictions on how hospitals
may pay physicians or provide financial benefit to them. In today’s
environment of increased demand for quality performance, paying physicians
for their contribution to hospital quality performance is increasingly
a sought after technique. In the proposed update to the 2009 Medicare
Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS), CMS asked for comments on how they
should approach gainsharing (“shared savings programs”)
and quality performance payments (“incentive payment plans”).
Alice responded with comments
on the quality payments . We do not believe gainsharing
programs are about quality. They are about saving hospitals money.
They have a short shelf life, distract physicians from work they
should be doing, and are not sustainable as a business model. We
do not comment on them to the government, although we do advise clients
who choose to implement them. Most of the programs which have been
greenlighted by the OIG are so overloaded with safeguards and protections
that they have relatively little utility, other than to the consultants
whom the OIG apparently thinks are a protection in their structuring
and review of these programs. Unfortunately, in their proposed regulations,
the government failed to understand the very significant policy and
operational differences between programs that pay physicians a portion
of shared savings and programs which pay physicians for contributing
to improved hospital quality performance as measured on nationally
recognized bases.
When the time came to actually publish an exception
that would address these issues, the regulators waffled. Instead
they posed 55 specific questions about how to regulate these
programs. There are many ways in which the Stark
program is out of control and this is one of them. Admitting
their lack of familiarity with quality measurement or improvement
techniques,
they called for answers to their questions, leaving the comment period
open another ninety days into February. Alice has provided a 16
page response addressing quality performance payment programs ,
setting forth the minimal regulation that is necessary here to safeguard
patients and protect against rewarding referrals. The government
has to stop using the Stark statute as a vehicle for basic regulation
of issues that are highly regulated already in other contexts.
The Medicare physician reimbursement
program has been criticized, for years, as a fee-for-service program
which, by definition, incentivizes physicians to overuse because
the more you do the more money you make. In addition, there is no
question that Medicare quality results have lagged, as quality results
across health care have failed to reach optimal levels. In her polemic
in the 2009 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, “Getting
The Team Paid: How Medicare Physician Payment Policies Impede Quality ”, Alice
looks at four principles now known to enhance quality, and how Medicare’s own payment policies thwart the
ability of physicians to deliver high quality care. Addressing specific
Medicare rules that are widely applicable, she also confronts head
on the now almost insufferable challenges presented by the Stark
statute and its interpretations. As she points out, Pete Stark, himself,
now regrets the law’s enactment. The regulators have created
a monstrous regulatory program which rivals the Tax Code in its complexity
without adding value. It doesn’t even work. Alice contrasts
the burdens that Medicare imposes with the PROMETHEUS Payment® model
(www.prometheuspayment.org)
which is a provider payment model explicitly designed to improve
quality, pay providers more rationally, lower administrative burden
and enhance patient engagement.
The organized
medical staff has a unique role in assuring the quality of care in
hospitals. Yet the volunteer medical staff members are under unprecedented
pressures which inhibit their willingness to take on tasks they traditionally
have performed for free – whether medical staff leadership,
service on committees, or on-call and indigent care coverage. Now,
there is some data showing that throughout the country, there is
an emerging bifurcation into alternate models of medical staff-hospital
relationships. (See, Casalino et al, “Hospital-Physician
Relations: Two Tracks And The Decline of the Voluntary Medical Staff”,
Health Affairs (Sept 2008). Where in the era of post-failed Clinton
health reform, hospitals bought primary care practices and then had
to unload them, more and more hospitals today are acquiring specialist
practices and employing specialist physicians. Equally present are
the settings in which members of the medical staff go into competition
with the hospital and cease to attend there as much as they used
to, while they own and develop ambulatory surgery centers, imaging
facilities and even whole specialty hospitals. What is the significance
of this for medical staff governance and quality surveillance? These
changes in organizational arrangements really ought to have little
meaning to the functioning of the organized medical staff in relationship
to the hospital board and administration with regard to its principal
responsibilities for quality. The medical staff members, whether
employed or independent or more typically a mix, still have a unique
role in the hospital.
Some commentators have taken the position that the
organized
medical staff is obsolete if not moribund. We believe they
may be wrong; although it is becoming increasingly important to
consider carefully just what the function of the medical staff
ought to be in the highest quality environments. If 20% of the
medical staff is responsible for 80% of the hospital admissions,
then who should be considered Active Staff with governance authority
to make the rules for the interrelationships among all physicians?
Who should define the quality culture for physicians? If the hospital
employs the physicians and mandates their participation in activities
that fundamentally do not interest them, what will be the outcome
for patients? If the medical executive committee is focused on
internecine warfare, endovascular food-fights and not how many
hearses leave the hospital and why, what will the hospital do without
a medical staff on whom it can rely to create a high quality environment?
We think these are essential questions which merit the attention
of hospitals, their boards and medical staff members. We do not
believe that employment of medical staff members ensures an engaged
medical staff which will work well on quality issues. We think
that the current moment in quality policy and demand for demonstrated
hospital quality performance offers an unprecedented opportunity
to reinvigorate the role of the medical staff around issues that
really matter.
Since the inception of this website
we have highlighted the inexorable movement of fraud enforcers to
direct targeting of quality problems as fraud. (See, link
to (3) #56, #45)
When the AHLA and the OIG published joint guidance to hospital boards
on their fiduciary
responsibilities for quality it was clearly game on! We have
highlighted the quality-compliance
nexus in
the past as well. The rules of the game have so intensified, however,
that we now believe that it can be said that a major goal for all
health care providers in the 21st century will be “Avoiding
Quality Fraud ”.
Alice’s article with Jim Reinertsen in Trustee magazine is
directed to hospital boards, but has meaning to everyone in health
care. The increasing volume of quality data reporting, implied statements
about quality in claims filed, and flat out false claims liability
lurk. It is significant that hospital quality data reporting has
been targeted by the OIG in the 2009
Work Plan as
a topic of attention. In her first participation in the teleconference
series offered by The Reinertsen Group, Alice elucidated the varieties
of these frauds and their pitfalls. In an updated, 60 minute presentation
she offers practical tips for avoiding quality fraud in a dialogue
with Jim and Jamie Orlikoff. The teleconference is available for
sale and download.
The Medical
Home, sometimes referred to as the “Patient-centered
Medical Home”, despite sounding like a website or new kind
of residential facility, is gaining traction as a route to reorganizing
the delivery of care to certain populations. Finding its foundation
40 years ago in pediatrics, it is now touted as the answer for
primary chronic care improvement as well as payment. A recent search
for those who are very successful with these programs has led Arnold
Milstein MD, to draw some interesting conclusions about what makes
for a “Medical
Home Run”. Unwavering commitment to keeping patients
out of the hospital is key. By the same token, though, a recent
issue of Health Affairs has looked at a variety of controversies
and claims regarding the medical home, from differences in its definition
and components, to whether those who might be most interested
in offering the medical home model in fact have the infrastructure
to do so. Rittenhouse, Casalino, et al, found that large
medical groups were better prepared with elements of infrastructure
alone (e.g., patient reminders, physician feedback, electronic
records and more) to offer this approach to organizing care delivery,
but even they were not routinely ready to do all that the medical
home model promises.
In reviewing the claims for this model, it appears
there are two movies currently playing in local theaters: Medical
Home: The Clinical Movie --- which is about organizing care
delivery to be sure patients can rely on a single practice to be
accountable for and responsive to their needs across the continuum
of care delivery; and then there is Medical Home: The Payment
Movie. Here the story is yet another transitional approach
to curing the dissymmetry between high quality, patient-centric clinical
processes and current payment models. Medical Home: The Payment Movie
seeks additional dollars to pay for the infrastructure which makes
coordination of care possible. In fact, were additional payment to
be made for intrastructure alone, there is no guarantee any change
in quality would result. Still, it is indisputable that it costs
money to implement infrastructure that makes a medical home possible
--- to use non-physicians to help engage patients in their own care,
maintain registries and other electronic data to foster clinically
important interactions with patients and to keep tabs on the care
they are getting.
The PROMETHEUS Payment® Model (www.prometheuspayment.org)
is highly consistent with the Clinical Movie script and is even better
than the transitional, small-additions-to-current-payments storyboard
of the Payment Movie. Also intriguing is the application of the medical
home clinical approach to other types of care, like hematology-oncology.
Those physicians are losing their business model based on drug payments
and ought be paid for the care and coordination that are the core
of what they do. Infectious disease physicians have similar issues,
as do rheumatologists treating arthritics. The basic premise of the
Clinical Movie is not only viable for primary care. It deserves consideration
elsewhere. Elements of it are consistent with UFT-A principles as
well. www.uft-a.com
The fraud and abuse
liabilities which lurk in inadequate quality performance have been
highlighted on this website since 2003
with an AGG Note and
later Alice's article in The Journal of Health Care Compliance, “Doing
What Matters.”
From Jim Sheehan’s first public statements on his priorities
regarding quality enforcement,
to the first OIG settlement based on quality
failures,
to Sheehan’s 2006 PowerPoint enumerating
the many ways in which quality will be the foundation for fraud enforcement,
the weight of punitive attention is increasing. Now, with the OIG's
published statements regarding
Board
responsibility for quality in hospital, and
a major initiative on nursing home quality performance beginning
with a joint publication with the Health
Care Compliance Association
the pace of the inexorable moves in this direction has quickened
considerably. Those who ignore the risks do so at their own peril.
Recognizing the need for a far better appreciation of these risks
in the hospital community, Jim Reinertsen and Jamie Orlikoff invited
Alice to provide the core content for a webinar to elucidate the
context for quality fraud and, more importantly, to provide practical
guidance on coping with this new compliance imperative. This program,
first presented in June 2008, has now been updated and made zippier
(one hour instead of 90 minutes) and was offered in March 2009, with
a recording
available.
First convened in December 2004
as a disparate group of experts intending to design a new payment
model, PROMETHEUS Payment® Inc.,
was awarded a $6.4
million grant from the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation,
to develop a scorecard, refine the concepts and most importantly
test the program in four pilot sites across the country. Having modeled
its first Evidence-informed Case Rates™ for actual implementation
beginning in 2009, the results are quite stunning. In her plain language
article, “Making
PROMETHEUS Payment® Rates Real: Ya’Gotta’ Start Somewhere ”
Alice explains the methodology of constructing the rates. First,
she elucidates how
the Design Team
took into account its clear understanding that physicians would be
suspicious of rates built on claims data. There are five specific
financial cushions built into the rates. The result is that the care
for a controlled non-insulin dependent diabetic, whose care comes
primarily from a physician office, would be paid based just on the
claims data at $311 a year; but, under the PROMETHEUS system, the
same patient’s care would be eligible for $2329 to the physician!!!
At the same time, what is most remarkable, is that this approach
to the broad problem of delivering science based diabetes care would
save the system represented in just the database we are using and
this one condition, more than $340 million. This is a very powerful
reason to move to the PROMETHEUS Payment® model. Similar results
are emerging for the other conditions we will address initially as
well. The more important hidden message in the article, though, is
whether our specific program is implemented is not the issue. Throughout
the American healthcare system, we are spending extraordinary amounts
of money on potentially avoidable complications, while we are not
paying providers enough to do what needs to be done to prevent those
complications in the first place. Exploring which services the PROMETHEUS
model considers to be potentially avoidable, and then analyzing how
to avoid them, is a good way to think about how to organize clinical
service delivery for better results with greater efficiency.
With her study of the current identified
effects of P4P, traditional compensation models within physician groups,
survey of groups which do
compensate on
quality and consideration of the legal issues in doing so, Alice
opened
the door to focusing on this aspect of motivating quality improvement.
In her article, “Compensation
for Quality: The Next Inevitable Step ”,
she not only makes the point that quality will never reach optimal
levels if physicians
do not have consistent payment
incentives within their groups, but she affirmatively calls for more
information about organizations which do pay their physicians for
quality. It is hard to believe that only 14 groups around the country,
and most of them very large multi-specialty organizations, are experimenting
with these efforts. If your group pays your physicians in any measure
for their quality performance or based on their quality performance,
please contact us at agosfield@gosfield.com with
your story.
The regulations now referred
to as “Stark III” have
added to the complexities of Stark compliance, but do not require
major reorganization of business or delivery relationships. There
are many opportunities for hospitals to help physicians with their
business case, including paying for quality performance, which
is particularly intriguing in light of the widespread emphasis on
measured
hospital quality improvement. In her two part article “Stark
III: Refinement Not Revolution”, Alice first identifies issues
associated with Stark
as applied within physician groups and
in the second part identifies opportunities
and pitfalls that the
new regulations raise ,
with regard to hospital-physician interactions.
The challenge of engaging physicians in quality
initiatives at the hospital often falls most heavily on the shoulders
of the
medical leadership in the C-suite, whether the chief medical officer
or the VPMA or the chief of staff. In their article directed to
these folks, “Finding Common Cause
in Quality: Confronting The Physician Engagement Challenge ”,
Jim Reinertsen and Alice Gosfield dispute
the metaphor offered by Jeff Goldsmith of the hospital-physician
engagement continuum as a coral reef of predators and prey. From
their continuing work
with IHI and medical staffs and hospitals around the country, they
continue to hold the firm belief that enormous strides can be made
for better patient care and more activated physicians, when physicians
are seen as the hospitals true partners and not mere customers.
A case decided in the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has taken the quality-payment
nexus further without
any “never event”, or a finding of fraud, or even a bad
outcome to the patients involved. In Pinnacle Health System v. Department
of Public Welfare (2008 WL 140985) the hospital appealed from payment
denials affirmed by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. The Medicaid
agency denied payment for psychiatric hospitalizations where the
patients were not seen by a psychiatrist on a daily basis. The hospital
argued there was no regulation requiring it. The agency argued that
this failure caused care to fall below the regulatory requirement
that care be rendered in accordance with "accepted
medical treatment standards." Both sides had experts -- the hospital's testifying
to the fact that daily visits were not medically necessary, the agency's
that daily visits were the standard of care. While the standard of
judicial review for administrative purposes was whether the determination
by the agency was supported by substantial evidence, the court held
that even though the standard of ‘accepted medical treatment
standards’ was general, it was not improperly vague and
did put providers on notice of what was expected of them.
Considering (1) standard managed care contract language regarding
treatment in accordance with accepted standards of care, (2) the
burgeoning expectations that American health care should be provided
at higher levels than it is, (3) increasing
fraud and abuse liability for quality failures and (4) that
malpractice caselaw which addresses the standard of care has imposed
as the standard
of care treatment regimens not
widely applied,
the Pinnacle case offers a tightening view of the quality imperative.
Without a finding of malpractice, fraud, or a “never event” payment
denial for failure to deliver services properly is a new reason to
do the right thing at the right time in the right way.
Pay for performance is sweeping the country.
Despite equivocal data as to success and impact, most payors regard
it as inevitable, and most physicians are resigned to its arrival
soon at a theater near them, if they are not already confronting
it. Medicare’s ‘pay for quality reporting’ initiative
really is “pay for whatever I did” because it is the
completion of the form, not the quality of the care, which gets the
payment bonus. CMS was met with a tepid enrollment of 17% of potential
participants. And that program is not limited
to physicians, but
includes other non-physician practitioners as well. While these
initiatives continue to be touted as ‘payment
reform,’ on the other side of the ledger, both CMS and many
health insurance programs are adopting no pay for no performance
programs by denying payment for never events -- mishaps of such an
egregious nature that they never should have occurred in the first
place. Hospital associations have stepped forward to say their members
will not bill for such events including wrong site surgeries, retention
of foreign objects after surgery, death or disability associated
with wrong type blood transfusions. First promulgated by the National
Quality Forum in 2002,
the list of the initial 27 “never events” is not without
controversy, since a range of the conditions cited include matters
which may have been present on admission (decubitus ulcers). Medicare
has proposed to add conditions to those it already requires to be
reported and on which it will not pay for the care devoted to treatment
of the event or complication. There is some question as to whether
this approach will be applied
to physicians.
In the PROMETHEUS Payment® model, a readmission for something
related to myocardial infarction within thirty days of discharge
is considered
a potentially avoidable complication for both the physician and hospital.
In a very different spin on ‘quality’,
this year marks the 20th anniversary edition of the Health Law Handbook.
The book was identified as unique, even in the annals of Thomson
Publishing Company, the parent of WestGroup, which now publishes
the book – having been the purchaser of the big fish that ate
Clark Boardman which first put it out in 1989. WestGroup noted the
longevity of the book, and the challenge of having one author for
all 20 editions. The book is written primarily for practicing
lawyers, but it has over all of its time, offered the insights and
opinions of well intentioned expert volunteers who share their intellectual
capital with their colleagues – and the non-lawyers who read
it, too – simply because they are asked to. Over the years
it has become available on Westlaw. The book is available online.
When the privacy regulations
were first adopted back in 2003, there was considerable anxiety among
the provider community,
and particularly physicians, with regard to the administrative burden
of compliance and intrusion in the doctor-patient relationship that
would come from the empowerment of patients to complain to the Office
of Civil Rights regarding violation of their right to privacy. The
OCR has now published data regarding enforcement of HIPAA
privacy complaints
and there can be no doubt that the number of complaints has indeed
gone up substantially. In 2004, the first full year of the program,
there were 6500 complaints filed. By 2007, that number had increased
to more than 8100. But this is the grand total of all complaints
received from all sources throughout the United States of America!
Hardly a tsunami of privacy violations. The data on the website reports
complaints filed by state and their resolutions. Although the ratios
have changed slightly, more cases are determined to have no violation
today, than four years ago. By far, most of the complaints are resolved
on investigation and review and do not proceed further (69%). Of
the cases that proceeded to investigation, last year produced almost
1500 ‘corrective actions’ (type unspecified) and a larger
number (750) than before were found to have no violations.
The ability to get proper on call coverage for the hospital emergency
department is a growing challenge for community hospitals as documented
by the Center for
Health System Change.
Specialist physicians have become increasingly fearful of serving
on the on-call rotation given increased liability and larger numbers
of indigent and uninsured patients. Medical staffs around the country
have reduced the requirements for physicians on the medical staff
to perform this function, which long was seen as the physician’s
professional responsibility, which in earlier times they fulfilled
without much complaint. To cope with this problem, hospitals have
developed a range of strategies which the center identifies in their
report. Now, for the first time, the OIG
has issued an advisory opinion
explicitly approving an on-call and indigent coverage program to
pay members of the medical staff for performing these services. Some
have declaimed the safeguards this hospital established as unwieldy
and impractical, but the good news is that the OIG has acknowledged
this critical dilemma. They are still confused, I think, over the
role of the medical staff and that most bylaws no longer require
most categories of the staff to provide coverage. And, the EMTALA
liabilities to make sure coverage is available are the hospital’s
and not the medical staff members’ unless they are on the on
call schedule. This is one of many ways in which hospitals can pay
physicians to do work on their behalf to the ultimate benefit of
their patients.
Clinical integration is a technique
by which independent physicians and group practices can relate to
one another for quality
and still
bargain collectively over price with managed care plans. Cited by
the FTC in virtually every settlement with IPAs and combinations
that bargained collusively over fees, the indicia of proper clinical
integration have not been well defined. Some settlements and one
Advisory Opinion, now
almost six years old, have staked out some of the turf, but most
of what the government has reviewed, it has always seemed, were activities
that have been motivated more by price than quality improvement.
The lack of clear guidance has led the American
Hospital Association to call on the FTC and DOJ for greater specificity
in describing what would qualify as good clinical integration. Now,
in their advisory
opinion to the Greater Rochester IPA,
the FTC has described a program which seems far more to emanate from
a quality impetus. Because GRIPA was well integrated clinically for
the work it did in connection with HMO products, it had a relatively
easier time orienting its activities to the PPO, fee for service,
business where the antitrust risks are far greater. The opinion is
a useful statement of one modern model of clinical integration.
The change in
the JCAHO Medical Staff Standard
to require that the medical staff bylaws be an integrated document
has created a firestorm of controversy that should be less than a
tempest in a teapot. Prediction of expensive disasters in redrafting
bylaws, and arguing over what is process versus what is procedure,
is absurd and fomented by a cadre of law firms who have made significant
income from advising medical staffs and hospitals that the bylaws
should be divided up into five different sections so that they may
be more easily amended. The Medical Staff Bylaws are the Constitution
of the Medical Staff and should be amended about as easily as the
US Constitution is amended. We have written and advised on medical
staff bylaws for more than 100 medical staffs all around the country
over the last 30 years, and this is not all we do, as it is for some
firms. We have never advised a medical staff to disaggregate their
bylaws.
The other noteworthy change adopted by the Joint Commission for
2009 was that the medical staff should have the right to propose
medical
staff
bylaws changes directly to the board. This should be non-threatening
unless you have a renegade medical staff or a renegade medical executive
committee where the representative function of the MEC has broken
down. It would be the board’s responsibility to sort this out
if the medical staff asked for changes, not recommended by the MEC,
that were not in the best interests of the hospital. Everyone should
calm down about these feared power struggles and focus on the real
purpose of the medical staff, which is to be responsible for quality
in the institution. When organizations do that effectively the medical
staff can become more galvanized for a far better purpose than internal
turf and power struggles.
In October 2007, the US Attorney in New Jersey entered
into deferred prosecution as well as settlement agreements with six
device manufacturers
who had paid physicians purportedly to advise them regarding the
development
of new devices.
Unfortunately, many of these were apparently no show jobs. But in
reading the settlements and corporate integrity agreements, while
the manufacturers agreed to cease what the government found to be
illegitimate relationships with physicians, the government did recognize
that paying no more than $500 an hour to physicians to perform real
services advising these companies would be permitted. This specifically
acknowledges that device manufacturers do have a legitimate need
for input from practicing physicians who might use their products.
There are many myths about how device manufacturers and physicians
may relate to each other. In “Physician
Investment in Start-Up Device Companies: Debunking The Myths”, Alice presents the boundaries of safety and a continuum of arrangements
between
physicians and device manufacturers.
The last five years have heard
a relentless call for information technology dissemination to improve
quality and lower costs in health
care. Electronic health records (EHR) have been touted as the first
and most important step to a real technology revolution. For physicians,
though, the cost of EHR implementation has often proven prohibitive.
The Stark and anti-kickback protections for donated medical records
was expected to jumpstart this effort. Not so fast. In his consideration
of downstreamed
EHR licenses Dan
Shay takes his primer
on EHR license agreements a
step further in explicating the special complications of tri-partite
license agreements. What
happens on termination is at least as important as what is entailed
in implementation.
Alice Gosfield and James Reinertsen
MD have been working on techniques to help physicians and hospitals
work better together
to improve
quality. In their white
paper for IHI as well as other
offerings,
they describe a six step plan to accomplish improved engagement around
quality. Now, in “Sharing
the Quality Agenda with Physicians ”,
they focus explicitly on the unique responsibility of lay
trustees to create more effective physician engagement with hospitals.
They explain how the board can ask the right questions and seek
the right
data to make engagement and quality strides effective and real. They
emphasize the importance of meeting the varying needs of different
segments of the medical staff and describe Stark compliant initiatives
that should be considered.
Pay for performance programs
show no signs of abating in popularity, yet their impact remains
equivocal. Whether quality would be better
if physicians within groups also paid themselves based on quality
performance is unknown. If the incentives of P4P are to have impact,
how are those monies distributed to the individual physicians once
the group gets paid? There is virtually nothing in the literature
on point. In “Physician
Compensation for Quality: Behind The Group’s Green Door ,” Alice
looks at the data on P4P programs, the basics of traditional compensation
within groups
and then presents the findings from a unique survey which was sent
out on her behalf by the AMGA producing responses from 14 groups
around the country who are variably paying for quality as part of
physician compensation. Some report significant improvement in quality
performance too. Alice then looks at the payment reform models on
the horizon and concludes that traditional notions of productivity,
on which most current group compensation models turn, will not reward
what the new systems, and most particularly the PROMETHEUS Payment® model
(www.prometheuspayment.org)
is designed to generate. She examines whether the Stark rules on
compensation will be a barrier to changed,
creative approaches, concludes that it will not, and then looks at
what employment contracts will have to accommodate to make physician
compensation for quality within groups real and of value
to both patients and physicians.
On December 5, 2006, Health
Affairs published a web exclusive series
of articles
offering some fascinating perspectives on hospital-physician relationships
which are particularly relevant to physician engagement with hospitals
around quality. Berenson, Ginsburg and May observe that physicians
have increasingly become competitors of the hospitals which were
formerly their most valued “significant others”. Fischer,
et al. argue that hospital quality results should be measured to
include the “extended hospital medical staff” which would
take in physicians who refer to the facility but never set foot in
it. Wilensky, Wolter, and Fischer present a new spin on gainsharing
as a way to meet the ever elusive goal of “aligned incentives”.
Smithson and Baker contend that the medical staff organization itself
is a moribund anomaly and not worth accommodating at all. Goldsmith
offers a view of the medical staff as a Darwinian coral reef with
predators and prey; while Cortese and Smoldt claim that legally integrated
hospital-physician entities are the only hope for the future.
The provocative juxtaposition of these articles reflects the intensity
of interest in the intersection of physicians’ economic behavior
with the hospital’s status as an institution where most of
the activities are driven by physician orders. All acknowledge that
improved medical staff-hospital relationships are indispensable in
today’s world.
Our work takes the position that the structure of these relationships
is not the issue at all. Too much time of lawyers and accountants
is spent constructing financial transactions that will bond the physicians
to the hospital by generating revenue for them. There is no question
that paying them for some activities is useful. Rebuilding trust
where it has broken can sometimes begin with a good business deal.
But, from the IHI
program and white
paper ,
to “Doing
Well By Doing Good ”
going back through a host of other publications including the AMA
White Paper from 1998, our
view is that most physicians have a profound interest in quality,
particularly in terms of outcomes for their patients and efficiency
in the use of their time. The holy grail of “aligned incentives” and
structure-driven solutions can only offer short-lived hope unless
these efforts recognize that physicians themselves are increasingly
reported on for their quality results, risk fraud and abuse enforcement
for quality failures, and have a strong cultural concern for excellence
and professionalism. All combine to define their business case for
quality which must be the fulcrum to better relationships with hospitals
if they are to be sustainable.
The increasing emphasis on quality
as a basis for fraud and abuse enforcement is now clear. Yet many
compliance officers are not integrated
into the quality activities of the organizations they serve. In her
viewpoint on “Doing
What Really Matters: The Compliance Connection to Quality ”
in the Journal of Health Care Compliance, Alice presents three activities
through which compliance officers
can work more effectively on quality issues in addition to the fundamental
challenge of raising the consciousness of the board and administration
of any healthcare entity to these new quality mandates.
Among the many strategies for closer alignment between hospitals
and their physicians are the proliferating joint ventures and financially
driven exercises, including gainsharing, that are intended to capture
with more revenues the loyalty of the medical staff members who are
involved. In an editorial in a recent issue of the Journal of Oncology, “Physician-Hospital
Partnerships: What Really Counts? ”, Alice argues
that unless the quality implications of hospital-physician ventures
are
their driving purpose, these transactions may generate short-term
revenues, but they will not feed the core needs of their participants.
Still, they may have an important role within the context of a well-thought
out physician engagement strategy.
The PROMETHEUS Payment® model is designed
explicitly to reward clinical collaboration among otherwise independent
providers. Since 30% of
any provider’s scores will turn on the performance of all the
other providers treating the patient for that condition, and scores
determine the totality of the payment a provider can receive, there
is a real reason to pay attention to the web of referral relationships – from
whom you take referrals, to whom and where you refer. Even when the
optimal moment for referral occurs would be an important point for
agreement among clinicians – whether primary care to specialty,
vice versa or among specialists. In fact, much of what PROMETHEUS
Payment® would reward, providers should be doing anyway. In her article “ A
New Payment Model for Quality: Why Care Now?” Alice
articulates some of the steps providers should be taking anyway to
improve their
care and their efficiency.
The Ventura County California hospital-medical
staff case generated a firestorm of controversy regarding board involvement
in medical
staff governance before it was eventually settled. The parties
had very intense views regarding the matters at hand. (See
the views expressed by the the attorneys
representing the physicians).
Subject to significant physician advocacy, the California legislature
enacted a law establishing the medical staff’s right
of self-governance in the most explicit terms ever . Specific
topics statutorily reserved to the medical staff include selection
of clinical criteria
and
standards to oversee and manage quality assurance and other medical
staff activities,
selection and removal of medical staff officers, and the right
to retain and be represented by independent legal counsel. In case
of
any dispute on these issues, the medical staff and hospital governing
board are obligated to meet and confer in good faith to resolve
the dispute. Astonishingly, though, the statute says that when
any person
or entity is even about to engage in acts or practices that hinder,
restrict or obstruct the ability of the medical staff to exercise
its rights, the superior court “on application of the medical
staff” may issue an injunction. (West’s Ann. Cal. Bus. & Prof
Code §2282.5). While acknowledging the ultimate authority
of the hospital board to protect the quality of medical care and
competency
of its medical staff, the legislature explicitly stated that their
final authority may only be exercised with a reasonable and good
faith belief that the medical staff has failed to fulfill a substantive
duty pertaining to quality of patient care.
Many commentators have characterized this legislation as establishing
that the medical staff must be considered an independent legal entity.
For many reasons this would be a disaster, although there are physician
advocates that have long called for this approach in the form of
incorporating the medical staff. Certainly the medical staff counsel
in the Ventura case makes that argument. We do not read the statute
as requiring that the medical staff be seen as an independent entity
and will be keenly interested in how it is interpreted by the courts.
The new possibilities for liability where a medical staff is separately
incorporated are significant: If it will then be able to conspire
with the hospital board under antitrust principles pertaining to
credentialing. It will have its own separate malpractice liability
for negligent credentialing. It would not be protected under the
hospital’s own director and officer’s liability insurance
but rather would have to obtain its own. The full interpretation
of the statutory provision is not yet known; but for medical staffs
which act responsibly to surveil the quality of care in the organizations
to which they direct their attention, the decision to incorporate
should not be lightly taken. While ‘bad cases make bad law’,
the essence of this law is not bad. It’s interpretation in
already difficult circumstances could create serious consequences.
In the last analysis, the extremely critical role of the organized
medical staff for quality assurance and particularly among their
peers, is strongly supported here. How to change the way medical
staffs and hospitals interact around quality is the key challenge
for hospitals of the future and a substantial theme in our work.
(See “In
Common Cause for Quality”, “Engaging
Physicians in a Shared Quality Agenda”, “W(h)ither
Medical Staffs?” and more throughout Latest Issues and
in Publications
The issue of how physicians can collaborate effectively
when two specialties seek to perform the same services has presented
increasing
challenges in many contexts. A classic problem area with regard to
this is the advent of coronary computerized tomographic angiography
(CTAs) performed by cardiologists who generally do not read the full
chest cavity. In contrast, radiologists frequently hold exclusive
privileges at the hospitals at which they practice and are not as
intensely focused on cardiac organs. The American College of Radiology
asked us to provide them with a white paper elucidating potential
reimbursement liabilities associated with splitting these interpretations.
That white
paper is
now available addressing these issues, all of which would be obviated
with the advent of PROMETHEUS Payment®.
Hospitals and physicians have
tried to collaborate more effectively through bonding, purchasing,
owning and managing.
Virtually none of these initiatives has improved quality of care.
In addition, the rise in economic credentialing, conflicts of interest
policies and disclosure of ‘competing investments’ further
entrenches the parties as disparate stakeholders. In her work with
hospitals and physicians in common cause for quality, Alice Gosfield
has focused on the negative effect of these initiatives. Frequently,
overly conservative attorneys contribute to mythologies pertaining
to the impact of Stark and the anti-kickback statute on these issues.
In an article jointly written with Jim Reinertsen, M.D., for Hospitals & Health
Networks Online,
they debunk these myths and offer strategies for more collaborative,
quality-enhancing relationships. The second
part of the presentation describes how PROMETHEUS Payment® can
further these relationships by supporting with a different payment
system efforts that hospitals and physicians ought to be involved
in any way.
In the 2007 Medicare Fee Schedule, the interrelationship
between the Stark in-office ancillary services exception and the
Medicare reassignment rule has been elucidated where the government
has emphasized and focused attention on fragmented joint ventures
(e.g. “pod” clinical laboratories) structured by attorneys
who have not understood that the Stark rules trump the reassignment
liberalizations. For any Stark designated health service,
no matter what the other reimbursement rules, the Stark rules are
the first
hurdle for compliance. Consequently, independent contractor relationships
that are generally allowed under the liberalized reassignment rules
will not meet the definition of in-office ancillary services since
an independent contractor is only in the group that is billing when
he uses their premises (e.g. radiologists reading off-site from the
group providing the technical component). We were not surprised by
this position since we believe that is what the rules have said all
along. However, the attention to these arrangements in the preface
to the Fee Schedule means that the government is becoming increasingly
aware of non-compliant creative solutions. Sometimes the answer is “you
just can’t do that”.
Pay for performance, while
a positive development in terms of focusing attention on the relationship
between quality
results and payment systems, cannot sustain itself as a business
model. How PROMETHEUS Payment® addresses the shortcomings of
P4P is important to understand. In addition, group practices are
ideally suited to take on PROMETHEUS Payment®, but only if
they also change their systems to be more efficient with measurable
quality. In "Getting
Beyond P4P: PROMETHEUS Payment® and
Group Practice",
Alice elucidates the potential positive nexus between the new payment
model and group configurations.
The need for broader implementation of electronic health records
(EHR)
and electronic prescribing has been decried far and wide in healthcare
policy, including by the appointment of a healthcare technology czar
within DHHS. The long awaited regulations under Stark and the
antikickback statute permit plans and hospitals to provide
EHR and e-prescribing software programs and assistance to physicians. This
is
a profound and important development which merits close attention
because, while the regulations have improved the environment
immeasurably, they are not without ambiguities. In these PowerPoint
slides the basics of the distinctions in what is permissible
under each law is summarized. But issues associated with the
prohibition on providing physicians with a program when they have
substantially the same software in place already presents some
significant challenges. What is substantially the same or similar?
Requiring physicians to pay 15% of the cost of the software can
present a problem when the hospital has a single license. In addition,
because this exception to the prohibitions on hospitals providing
tangible goods of real value to physicians who refer to them, was
adopted as part of the Medicare prescription drug benefit enacted
by
Congress, there are mandates that e-prescribing be part of the
software. The real point is that if quality is really to advance
more
quickly than following its glacial pace of the last thirty years,
widespread movement to electronic record support is critical. These
regulations are a major step on that pathway and should be examined
carefully by physicians, hospitals and plans.
In a blog interview conducted by a surgeon who has
been a client,
Alice is questioned about how she became a health lawyer, her views
on
P4P, why she didn't become a physician and more. For a real change
of
pace go to http://insidesurgery.com/.
The impetus for quality comes in many
forms. Alice has co-authored an article with James L. Reinertsen,
MD in the November/December
2005 issue of Health Affairs, "The
100,000 Lives Campaign: Crystallizing Standards of Care for Hospitals",
which makes the case that IHI's 100,000 Lives Campaign has
changed overnight
the legal standard of care for hospitals throughout
this country --- whether they enrolled in the campaign or not. We
elucidate why.
We speculate on the kinds of cases which failure to implement the
six planks of the campaign will generate. We look at the top ten
reasons hospitals get sued and place the planks in that context.
Risk avoidance certainly adds to the business case for quality. And
then we say why fear of malpractice liability is not the real reason
to implement the six planks. Moral reasons and a call to the true
mission of health care enterprises are the real motivations to
prevent preventable deaths.
As health plans and health systems have
consolidated and fraud and abuse enforcement has intensified throughout
healthcare,
the natural
business tendencies in any other industry for business partners
to find ways to benefit each other economically in win-win strategies
has been stifled in health care. Anxiety over fraud and abuse and
antitrust risks, has gotten in the way of hospitals and physicians
on one hand and health plans and physicians on the other working
together for their mutual economic benefit with the purpose
of improving
quality. In a new chapter in the Health Law Handbook, Alice
makes the argument that until the three principal drivers of the
care
that patients receive in this country take common ownership of
the quality
mission and stop thinking of themselves as disparate, adversarial
stakeholders, quality will never advance to the levels we would
like. "In
Common Cause for Quality"
she articulates a perspective on how to consider a business case
for quality, sets forth the
quality demands on hospitals and health plans which cannot be met
without
full cooperation of physicians and debunks the myths that the law
impedes collaboration which benefits any party economically. She
then enumerates10 specific strategies by which hospitals and health
plans can advance the physician's business case for quality through
activities with direct beneficial financial impact on those physicians.
She also presents 6 additional strategies through which physicians
can and will have to help hospitals to optimize their quality efforts.
In "Enhancing Oncology's Business
Case: How the Hospital Can Help " she presents a crisper version of these arguments
in terms of how oncologists can safely look to their hospitals to
help them with their own quality demands.
For quality to advance in
this country, it is becoming increasingly clear that universal electronic
medical records will
be necessary. Proposed regulations to permit hospitals to provide
record systems to their physicians have been published under Stark.
Many physician practices are looking to obtain these programs. Whatever
the source of an electronic health record system, it is
certain there will have to be a license agreement by which the practice
obtains access to the software, unless they build their own. In "A
Primer on Electronic Health Records License Agreements", Daniel
Shay reviews the context for these contracts, elucidates their common
features, based on reviews of real-life documents, and points
out pitfalls that physician practices should avoid in obtaining access
to these vital practice accessories. In a practical, easily applied
application of the deeper issues addressed in the primer, Daniel
has also offered guidance on “Top
Ten Questions To Ask When Looking At An EHR License Agreement.”
While quality performance measurement initiatives have received
considerable attention and are rising to the fore as a significant
force in the healthcare market place, less appreciated is the sub-rosa
use of “efficiency measures” by health plans to evaluate
resource consumption (i.e., costliness) by providers. While health
plans have been using these proprietary software measurement programs
for some time, there is now an increasing appreciation that making
efficiency information available can serve a variety of useful purposes
other than simply excluding providers from networks. In California and
Washington
new programs to inform physicians as to their relative efficiency
evaluations
are being touted as important developments to facilitate delivery
of appropriate quality care. In Tennessee,
the hospital association has joined with a local Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plan to
publish report cards on efficiency performance. Bridges to Excellence
has issued a white paper addressing principles associated with equitable
efficiency measurement.
The
rise of quality performance measurement and public reporting, controversies
associated with these activities, and potential legal
liabilities are addressed in the new AGG Note, “Performance
and Efficiency Measurement: Implications for Provider Positioning ”
This phenomenon further underscores the value in physicians, in
particular, coming together in clinically integrated
networks to improve their performance,
learn from each other, develop data that can be shared with payors
in a meaningful way, and potentially collectively bargain over
fees. This AGG Note offers practical steps to begin integrating.
CMS has finally issued its first Stark
advisory opinion since
the publication of the Phase II final regulations. While the analysis
was supportive of the position of the physicians, the issue it addressed
hardly advances the state of the art in interpreting the statute.
In this instance, a 700 physician multi-specialty physician group
sought the approval of CMS that stock ownership by the physicians
in a not for profit tax exempt organization (apparently permitted
under applicable state law) did not violate the statute. The opinion
is superfluous in its import but at least it has gotten the ball
rolling on issuing opinions.
Congress has stepped into the debate regarding protection of potentially
negative quality information in the interest of improving quality
with the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005 .
Providers who come together to engage in patient safety activities
and report their “patient safety work product” to “patient
safety organizations”(“PSOs”) can be assured that
the data they are reporting will be protected from discovery and
will be treated confidentially, at least as the law reads. Judicial
interpretation may produce different results. Courts have undermined
many state peer review protection acts; but to be fair, most were
enacted in the mid-1970’s and their drafting did not anticipate
the very different context today in which plaintiffs seek to use
them.
“Patient safety activities” are broadly inclusive and
go well beyond strict patient safety. Any organization seeking to
be recognized as a patient safety organization must be involved in:
efforts to improve patient safety and quality of healthcare delivery;
collection and analysis of patient safety work product; development
and dissemination of information to improve patient safety such as
recommendations, protocols, or information regarding best practices;
utilization of patient safety work product for the purpose of encouraging
a culture of safety and providing feedback and assistance to minimize
patient risk; maintaining procedures to preserve confidentiality
with respect to the work product; providing appropriate security
measures for the work product; using qualified staff and engaging
in other activities related to the operating of a patient safety
evaluation system to provide feedback to the participants. A “patient
safety evaluation system” means collection, management or analysis
of information for reporting to or by a patient safety organization.
The data protected includes written materials, reports, records,
memoranda, and analyses as well as oral statements. The statute provides
for the creation of a network of patient safety databases. Moreover,
patient safety organizations self-nominate and attest to their certification
that they qualify.
The statute is self-executing and effective upon enactment. Obviously
some administrative mechanisms will be necessary for PSOs to list
themselves. And the Secretary does have authority to issue regulations,
which may clarify the import of this statute. Nonetheless, this law
has the potential to facilitate robust quality relevant activities
and provider groups would do well to consider taking advantage of
whatever protections it does offer.
The Stark statute and regulations present a host of structuring
and operational challenges for most physicians. Radiologists have
often believed that they are immune from the implications of Stark
since their ordering of diagnostics studies pursuant to a consultation
is excluded from the definition of an implicated referral under Stark.
However, this does not mean radiologists need not pay attention to
the Stark statute. Moreover, many other types of physicians are seeking
to engage radiologists in concert with them to deliver imaging services
to their patients. Liabilities lurk everywhere. In “Radiologists
and Their Business Significant Others: Underappreciated Traps in
Stark ”,
we describe where some of these pitfalls lurk.
Physicians and their practice managers frequently consider contracts
to be overly burdensome, too detailed, and too expensive to create.
Paradoxically, though, they similarly want assurances that when they
do create a contract that it will be “iron-clad”. These
are naïve misunderstandings of the enormous power and value
that contracts have in the modern business environment. As physicians
relate to others in a wide variety of ways, whether in employment,
joint ventures, vendor relationships or otherwise, contracts define
their business context. By the same token, a contract is only as
good as the will of the parties to abide by it, so a clear and common
understanding of the goals and intentions is essential. In “Understanding
Contracts: The Glue of Modern Business Relationships ”,
elucidates with specific reference to typical physician relationships,
those fundamental aspects of contracts that are often referred to
as “boilerplate” or appear in the back of the document
and are assumed not to be important. This is must reading for anyone
who signs a contract no matter the purpose.
In an article in Community Oncology, Alice makes the argument that
because of the perverse impact of the Medicare drug payment model
on oncology practices, they have neglected to focus on their own
business case for some time. When much of your income is driven by
profits made on the provision of pharmaceuticals to patients, a reduction
in that payment can result in significant practice dislocation. For
oncologists, the moment may well be optimal to really consider clinical
integration. In “Better
Quality, Better Margins: Seizing the Moment ” Alice
elucidates these connections in relationship to the application of
UFT-A principles.
As is often the case when the government breaks
new ground, egregious fact patterns make for important precedents.
On the other hand,
the real message in the government's recent CMP settlements on
kickbacks
is that fair market value is a real basis for enforcement and
it is not what the parties negotiate between them. It is determined
by reference to the general market and is best established by a
third party valuation. A third party valuation, however, is not
by itself
a silver bullet. These valuations are subject to manipulation and
can be supported by financial analyses that otherwise run counter
to the statute. For example, in a case handled by this office regarding
a payment associated with the valuation of a physician practice,
the valuator returned a statement that the practice was worth between
$23,000 and $2,000,000. This is not only worthless, it creates
increased potential liability by forcing the parties to shop for
another opinion.
Similarly, a valuation methodology that takes into account continued
referrals can be problematic if not constructed appropriately.
Third party valuations, like requests for compliance-oriented audits
of
claims, are best conducted when the question posed is very carefully
crafted with legal guidance.
In its Jan/Feb 2005 issue, Health Affairs offered a range
of articles confronting issues in evidence based medicine. One of
them, by Timmermans
and Mauck, cited a number of barriers to widespread physician adoption
of clinical practice guidelines. Alice Gosfield and Jim Reinertsen
noted that where guidelines are nothing but an add on to a system
which imposes unmanageable administrative burdens already, there
is little to motivate physicians to use them. Our letter to the editor,
published in the May/June 2005 issue of Health
Affairs, points out that to use CPGs as the foundation
for all processes, both administrative and clinical, makes a far
better business case
for their use.
Since the inception of the DRG
program in 1982, hospitals have been trying to find a way to motivate
the physicians on their
staffs to
work with them to lower expenses by sharing savings generated. These
'gainsharing' notions had been virtually precluded to them going
back as far as a Paracelsus hospital company program in 1983, and
then in more modern iterations, by virtue of the OIG's Special Advisory
Bulletin on Gainsharing
Arrangements
in 1999. Although the OIG approved one gainsharing program 18 months
after the Bulletin (see discussion in Alice Gosfield's article on "Making
Quality Happen: In Search of Legal Weightlessness" ),
the structure and operation of that program seemed sufficiently idiosyncratic
as not to offer much by way of a model. Now the OIG
has published six advisory opinions approving 'gainsharing' programs,
where cardiologists and cardiac surgeons will be permitted
to share
in the savings hospitals generate by virtue of standardization of
surgical supplies and their uses. As we note in our five principles
for UFT-A, standardization for purposes of quality is important as
an element of a business case for quality; but the advent of these
gainsharing approvals further supports a business case for broad
and deep standardization to the evidence. On the other hand, the
gainsharing programs are time limited, appear to be predominately
applicable in surgical contexts or analogous circumstances and hardly
will serve to drive a sustainable business model for physicians.
Clinical integration has been held
out by the FTC in every physician network settlement into which they
have entered in the last few years. "You
can't do this, but if you were clinically integrated you could." Some
have questioned whether clinical integration is really available
as an option to facilitate providers bargaining with payors. Brown
and Toland in California was the subject of an FTC enforcement action
in 2003 for their PPO
bargaining activities.
When they eventually settled, they agreed not to undertake any PPO
bargaining unless the FTC prior approved what they were doing as
sufficient clinical integration. The FTC has now reviewed Brown and
Toland's ( B & T) approach and has said it represents enough
clinical integration to permit negotiations, but they will still
be subject to review for conformity with the integration principles.
B& T says that the elements
of integration they have adopted
are a utilization
review program, disease management and case management activities
and an electronic medical record.
This is meaningful because until this point there has been only one
advisory opinion which addressed
acceptable elements of clinical integration and now the B & T
program is different. The FTC says it will review their actual
implementation; but
this action stands for the proposition that clinical integration
is alive and well. It also means clinical integration does not require
a uniform approach consistent in every respect with the hypothetical
facts set forth when its permissibility was first published by the
FTC in 1996. We think that UFT-A offers an option which will, by
its implementation, create appropriate clinical integration to qualify
for joint bargaining.
"You cannot improve what you cannot measure". "What
gets measured, gets done." These truisms about quality improvement
reflect the importance of performance measurement which is being
used not only for P4P but also for network selection, reorganizing
care delivery processes, and transforming the culture of health care
organizations. For all of the policy interest in core data sets and
standardization of measures, the current context offers anything
but. The varieties of measures and measurers seems to be proliferating
rather than consolidating. There are controversies and quandaries
in performance measurement, as well as lurking legal liabilities
both for those who would select and use measures as well as those
who do not or do so ineffectively. In "The
Performance Measures Ball: Too Many Tunes, Too Many Dancers?"
Alice Gosfield offers a view of the new Medicare Modernization Act
initiatives which
relate to measurement; explores why the explosion of interest in
measurement and measures now; clarifies concepts around measurement;
provides a snapshot of the major players and their approaches including
CMS, NQF, JCAHO, AHRQ and IHI; considers the significant controversies
surrounding measurement initiatives; and speculates on legal pitfalls
in this essential component of quality improvement and a business
case for quality.
With the reemphasis on 'transparency' in health care
quality policy, more and more quality information about providers
will be made available.
The commercial value of provider data is also increasing. Providers
enter into many contractual relationships where data about them may
be in play, even if that is not the focus of the relationship. For
example, a managed care contract, a practice management company relationship,
obtaining an electronic medical record from a software vendor, or
hiring a billing company are all relationships where significant
provider data will be at issue. In "Commerce
in Provider Data: What, Why and Provider Contractual Controls"
Daniel Shay looks at what is proprietary to a provider, considers
who is reporting
data and why, and offering actual contract language as well as case
law, addresses contractual protections providers should think about
in entering into relationships with a range of other entities.
The implications of the Stark Phase II regulations
when considered in light of Medicare reimbursement restrictions merit
a new look.. In our
AGG Note "Medicare
Reimbursement Through The Stark Looking Glass",
we elucidate some of the contradictions
and unappreciated
pitfalls lurking in issues pertaining to physician-to-physician referrals,
in-office ancillary services, incident to billing, reassignment,
and diagnostic testing. Unlike our previous AGG Notes, “Stark
II, Phase II: The Interim Final Story”, (May 2004)
and “Much
Better Late Than We Thought: Stark II Final Regulations”,
(February 2001) rather than reporting on the contents of the
Stark regulations,
this new AGG Note is more analytical. It should be read with
the other two for a complete understanding of the internecine workings
of Stark.
Even as Joint Commission has expanded its attention on quality improvement activities in the hospital, hospitals that do not rely on “deemed status” based on their Joint Commission survey will have to meet the CMS conditions of participation which now require the hospital to develop, implement and maintain a data driven quality assessment and performance improvement program (42 CFR § 482.21) which must rely on quality indicator data. The Board itself is held accountable for the operation of the program. (42 CFR § 482.21(e)). This reemphasis should further propel hospital boards in stewarding the data driven quality improvement of their organizations.
Regarding Stark, there remain considerable confusions about this badly drafted and misguidedly conceived piece of legislation. The fundamental concerns that motivated the legislation are legitimate: (1) Will physician investment motivate referral to poor quality, financially related entities; (2) Will Medicare overpay entities which create specious joint ventures just to investor physician referrals; (3) Will tainted referrals yield medically unnecessary care for financial return? The statute does precious little to address these core questions. Over the years we have addressed many of the misconceptions and myths about the law and regulations in addition to our two AGG Notes, two part article in Family Practice Management (Part I, Part II) and Ten Myths About the Stark Statute Debunked. Further exploration appears in the new article “Is Your Group A Group?”
The essential nature of the transaction that
takes place between physician and patient, as first articulated by
Jim Reinertsen in
1997, in “Health Care: Past, Present and Future” (Group
Practice Journal, March/April 1997—Vol. 46, No. 2) is the
critical touchstone for UFT-A
principles. It has also been acknowledged in the Crossing the
Quality Chasm statement that “Transferring
knowledge is care.” High quality care, therefore, is care that
occurs when the conditions permitting the most effective transfer
of knowledge have been optimized. In her article, “The
Doctor-Patient Relationship as The Business Case for Quality”, Alice
Gosfield elaborates on these themes and the legal predicates for
improved physician as business case for quality.
Interim
Final Stark Regulations have
now been published addressing the remaining statutory exceptions
that were unaddressed under Phase II and creating a host of new regulatory
exceptions. From recruitment subsidies from hospitals, to in office
ancillary services, to professional courtesy, the Stark regulations
reach into transactions large and small. The legislation is misguided,
badly drafted, and unnecessarily complex. It may be the worst piece
of legislation in thirty years of health care enactments, but it
is law and the regulators have done the best they can to make it
livable in the real world. Our AGG
Note, ”Stark
II, Phase II: The Interim Final Story,” explores in real life
scenarios some of the most commonly applicable issues and expounds
on the implications
of some others. It should be read in conjunction with our 2001 AGG
Note, “Better Late Than We Thought: Final Stark Regulations”.
There will be a Phase III though which will surely clarify some of
these matters. You can also read our comments on three issues which
we have raised in response to the open
call for comments. Our
other publications on point include our two articles in Family Practice
Management, “The
Stark Truth About Stark” (Part
I, Part
II) and our piece in
the Journal of Medical Practice Management, “Ten
Myths About the Stark Statute Debunked.” 
“Pay for Performance”(P4P) is a new phenomenon
intended to incentivize physicians and hospitals to render high quality
by paying them differently if they perform in accordance with criteria.
From Leapfrog, to CMS, to the Bridges to Excellence program and the
activities of the Integrated Health Association in California, there
are many variations on this theme. That the government is in this
game can also be seen in a little noted provision in HR 1 that the
formerly ‘voluntary’ hospital quality reporting initiative
is now not quite so voluntary since hospitals that do not report
their data to CMS will experience a .4% reduction in their Medicare
payment, each year they do not report. In “Contracting
for Quality: Then, Now and P4P” we
explore the impetus for these programs, describe and analyze their
principal manifestations
and consider how they relate to the contractual context within which
they arise, both for hospitals and physicians. We conclude that while
pay for performance is an important development, it is, at best,
transitional and, as we first discussed in our White Paper “Doing
Well by Doing Good: Improving the Business Case for Quality” these
initiatives do not make an adequate case for offering physicians
improved financial margins despite increased revenue. In addition,
because these are ‘add-ons’ to the existing contractual
environment and the P4P programs often unfold with no supporting
contract at all, they present real and unexplored challenges for
the providers who participate. We continue to believe that payment
systems that carve out a new approach with
many of the same goals and features of these P4P programs are better.
One of the major thorns
in the side of physicians confronting managed care payors has been
their antitrust risk if they bargain for fees
collectively. We have posited that ‘clinical integration’,
which the antitrust regulators have said can permit otherwise collusive
bargaining among competing physicians, is part of the business
case for quality. In
each of the physician and hospital network settlements in
the last months, the FTC has noted that the physician groups were
not sufficiently integrated financially or
clinically. In the settlement with Brown and Toland, the FTC imposed
a new requirement that if they chose to bargain based on clinical
integration they would have to submit their approach to the FTC before
implementation. Given the dearth of regulatory guidance on point,
and only one advisory opinion to
date, it is with great pleasure that we are able to make available
an important
article from our 2004 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK by Bob Leibenluft who was
the head of the health care division of the FTC when the clinical
integration opportunity was made available. In “Clinical
Integration: Assessing the Antitrust Issues” Bob
and his colleague Tracy Weir, acknowledge that the antitrust regulators
have not seen
much real clinical integration. We think that is probably true since
much of what we are familiar with as purported to demonstrate clinical
integration, in fact, does not go far enough. Still his article supports
our case that doing what we suggest in our ‘unified
field theory’ work would
likely meet the regulators’ criteria.
Prosecutors are becoming increasingly interested in how quality
implicates the fraud and abuse statutes. From understaffing in hospitals,
to care which does not meet professionally recognized standards,
to over-utilization, new theories of false claims and flat out fraud
based on the clinical care rendered are emerging. Initially used
to force some 40 or more false claims settlements around the country
with nursing homes, prosecutors have now made it clear they intend
to use similar theories to prosecute hospitals. In the current environment
of diminishing reimbursement and heightened attention to quality,
the fraud and abuse risks from less than optimal clinical behavior
can no longer be ignored. Unless these issues are addressed in compliance
programs, those initiatives will remain mired in the narrow focus
of the administrative minutiae of billing problems, leaving the health
care enterprise vulnerable and their compliance staff isolated from
the principal focus of the organization – delivering high quality
care.
At the same time, how to set priorities for compliance activities
is beginning to stymie those compliance programs that addressed initial,
low hanging fruit with corrective, voluntary actions. Some of our
clients are struggling with where to go next. Many of them seem to
believe that the role of compliance is to forever search out errors
to report and repay. We do not share this view. We believe compliance
is about doing it right in the first place and cleaning up problems
found. It is not about eternal internal inspection. Our new AGG
Note, “The
Quality/Compliance Nexus: Moving to Programmatic Integration”
examines the developing enforcement environment, sets forth liabilities
already on the books, and then discusses how using clinical
practice guidelines in
compliance can integrate its import into the fundamental mission
of health care. The result
can be to (1) enhance compliance itself by making it meaningful for
those from whom compliance is sought, (2) save time for the clinicians,
and (3) actually improve quality on an on-going basis. |