The fraud and abuse
liabilities which lurk in inadequate quality performance have been
highlighted on this website since 2003
with an AGG Note and
later her article in The Journal of Health Care Compliance, “Doing
What Matters.”
From Jim Sheehan’s first public statements on his priorities
regarding quality enforcement,
to the first OIG settlement based on quality
failures,
to Sheehan’s 2006 PowerPoint enumerating
the many ways in which quality will be the foundation for fraud enforcement,
the weight of punitive attention is increasing. Now, with the OIG's
published statements regarding
Board
responsibility for quality in hospital, and
a major initiative on nursing home quality performance beginning
with a joint publication with the Health
Care Compliance Association
the pace of the inexorable moves in this direction has quickened
considerably. Those who ignore the risks do so at their own peril.
Recognizing the need for a far better appreciation of these risks
in the hospital community, Jim Reinertsen and Jamie Orlikoff invited
Alice to provide the core content for a webinar to elucidate the
context for quality fraud and, more importantly, to provide practical
guidance on coping with this new compliance imperative. She identifies
specific implications for physician groups. A recording of that program
is now available. Click
here.
First convened in December 2004
as a disparate group of experts intending to design a new payment
model, PROMETHEUS Payment® Inc.,
has now been awarded a $6.4
million grant from the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation,
to develop a scorecard, refine the concepts and most importantly
test the program in four pilot sites across the country. Having modeled
its first Evidence-informed Case Rates™ for actual implementation
beginning in 2009, the results are quite stunning. In her plain language
article, “Making
PROMETHEUS Payment® Rates Real: Ya’Gotta’ Start Somewhere ”
Alice explains the methodology of constructing the rates. First,
she elucidates how
the Design Team
took into account its clear understanding that physicians would be
suspicious of rates built on claims data. There are five specific
financial cushions built into the rates. The result is that the care
for a controlled non-insulin dependent diabetic, whose care comes
primarily from a physician office, would be paid based just on the
claims data at $311 a year; but, under the PROMETHEUS system, the
same patient’s care would be eligible for $2329 to the physician!!!
At the same time, what is most remarkable, is that this approach
to the broad problem of delivering science based diabetes care would
save the system represented in just the database we are using and
this one condition, more than $340 million. This is a very powerful
reason to move to the PROMETHEUS Payment® model. Similar results
are emerging for the other conditions we will address initially as
well. The more important hidden message in the article, though, is
whether our specific program is implemented is not the issue. Throughout
the American healthcare system, we are spending extraordinary amounts
of money on potentially avoidable complications, while we are not
paying providers enough to do what needs to be done to prevent those
complications in the first place. Exploring which services the PROMETHEUS
model considers to be potentially avoidable, and then analyzing how
to avoid them, is a good way to think about how to organize clinical
service delivery for better results with greater efficiency.
With her study of the current identified
effects of P4P, traditional compensation models within physician groups,
survey of groups which do
compensate on
quality and consideration of the legal issues in doing so, Alice
opened
the door to focusing on this aspect of motivating quality improvement.
In her article, “Compensation
for Quality: The Next Inevitable Step ”,
she not only makes the point that quality will never reach optimal
levels if physicians
do not have consistent payment
incentives within their groups, but she affirmatively calls for more
information about organizations which do pay their physicians for
quality. It is hard to believe that only 14 groups around the country,
and most of them very large multi-specialty organizations, are experimenting
with these efforts. If your group pays your physicians in any measure
for their quality performance or based on their quality performance,
please contact us at agosfield@gosfield.com with
your story.
The regulations now referred
to as “Stark III” have
added to the complexities of Stark compliance, but do not require
major reorganization of business or delivery relationships. There
are many opportunities for hospitals to help physicians with their
business case, including paying for quality performance, which
is particularly intriguing in light of the widespread emphasis on
measured
hospital quality improvement. In her two part article “Stark
III: Refinement Not Revolution”, Alice first identifies issues
associated with Stark
as applied within physician groups and
in the second part identifies opportunities
and pitfalls that the
new regulations raise ,
with regard to hospital-physician interactions.
The challenge of engaging physicians in quality
initiatives at the hospital often falls most heavily on the shoulders
of the
medical leadership in the C-suite, whether the chief medical officer
or the VPMA or the chief of staff. In their article directed to
these folks, “Finding Common Cause
in Quality: Confronting The Physician Engagement Challenge ”,
Jim Reinertsen and Alice Gosfield dispute
the metaphor offered by Jeff Goldsmith of the hospital-physician
engagement continuum as a coral reef of predators and prey. From
their continuing work
with IHI and medical staffs and hospitals around the country, they
continue to hold the firm belief that enormous strides can be made
for better patient care and more activated physicians, when physicians
are seen as the hospitals true partners and not mere customers.
A case recently decided in the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has taken the quality-payment
nexus further without
any “never event”, or a finding of fraud, or even a bad
outcome to the patients involved. In Pinnacle Health System v. Department
of Public Welfare (2008 WL 140985) the hospital appealed from payment
denials affirmed by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. The Medicaid
agency denied payment for psychiatric hospitalizations where the
patients were not seen by a psychiatrist on a daily basis. The hospital
argued there was no regulation requiring it. The agency argued that
this failure caused care to fall below the regulatory requirement
that care be rendered in accordance with "accepted medical treatment
standards." Both sides had experts -- the hospital's testifying
to the fact that daily visits were not medically necessary, the agency's
that daily visits were the standard of care. While the standard of
judicial review for administrative purposes was whether the determination
by the agency was supported by substantial evidence, the court held
that even though the standard of ‘accepted medical treatment
standards’ was general, it was not improperly vague and
did put providers on notice of what was expected of them.
Considering (1) standard managed care contract language regarding
treatment in accordance with accepted standards of care, (2) the
burgeoning expectations that American health care should be provided
at higher levels than it is, (3) increasing
fraud and abuse liability for quality failures and (4) that
malpractice caselaw which addresses the standard of care has imposed
as the standard
of care treatment regimens not
widely applied,
the Pinnacle case offers a tightening view of the quality imperative.
Without a finding of malpractice, fraud, or a “never event” payment
denial for failure to deliver services properly is a new reason to
do the right thing at the right time in the right way.
Pay for performance is sweeping the country.
Despite equivocal data as to success and impact, most payors regard
it as inevitable, and most physicians are resigned to its arrival
soon at a theater near them, if they are not already confronting
it. Medicare’s ‘pay for quality reporting’ initiative
really is “pay for whatever I did” because it is the
completion of the form, not the quality of the care, which gets the
payment bonus. CMS was met with a tepid enrollment of 17% of potential
participants. And that program is not limited
to physicians, but
includes other non-physician practitioners as well. While these
initiatives continue to be touted as ‘payment
reform,’ on the other side of the ledger, both CMS and many
health insurance programs are adopting no pay for no performance
programs by denying payment for never events -- mishaps of such an
egregious nature that they never should have occurred in the first
place. Hospital associations have stepped forward to say their members
will not bill for such events including wrong site surgeries, retention
of foreign objects after surgery, death or disability associated
with wrong type blood transfusions. First promulgated by the National
Quality Forum in 2002,
the list of the initial 27 “never events” is not without
controversy, since a range of the conditions cited include matters
which may have been present on admission (decubitus ulcers). Medicare
has proposed to add conditions to those it already requires to be
reported and on which it will not pay for the care devoted to treatment
of the event or complication. There is some question as to whether
this approach will be applied
to physicians.
In the PROMETHEUS Payment® model, a readmission for something
related to myocardial infarction within thirty days of discharge
is considered
a potentially avoidable complication for both the physician and hospital.
The antikickback statute has
been enforced for the most part in settlements between the government
and those alleged to have violated
the rules. Most of the cases brought to date have entailed fact patterns
where there have been actual payments for referrals or clear in-kind
benefits flowing between one provider and another. Now in a novel
whistleblower
case out of Ohio,
the government has intervened in a case which turns on the alleged
preferential allocation of heart station service slots to one large
cardiology group over others. The issue of interpretations of diagnostic
studies performed on unassigned patients, most of whom come through
the emergency department, is one which has been at a slow boil on
many hospital campuses for years. Because cardiology is one of the
most important specialties to most hospitals, finding ways to keep
peace in the cardiology valley is always a challenge. Where one very
large group dominates the staff, tensions can arise. Here, a retired
cardiologist is the whistleblower. The real implications, though,
are that if assignment of unassigned patients on a heart station
rotation schedule is a potential benefit susceptible to fraud enforcement,
then so are the clinical privileges which hospitals seek to restrict
through their loyalty oaths and economic credentialing exclusions.
In a very different spin on ‘quality’,
this year marks the 20th anniversary edition of the Health Law Handbook.
The book was identified as unique, even in the annals of Thomson
Publishing Company, the parent of WestGroup, which now publishes
the book – having been the purchaser of the big fish that ate
Clark Boardman which first put it out in 1989. WestGroup noted the
longevity of the book, and the challenge of having one author for
all 20 editions. The book is written primarily for practicing
lawyers, but it has over all of its time, offered the insights and
opinions of well intentioned expert volunteers who share their intellectual
capital with their colleagues – and the non-lawyers who read
it, too – simply because they are asked to. Over the years
it has become available on Westlaw. The book is available online.
Under the auspices of the Office of the Governor, North Carolina
has launched a statewide program to implement evidence-based care
guidelines for five chronic conditions. Health plans and providers
have agreed to provide consistent services to patients regardless
of their health insurance coverage. The initiative
was apparently a year in its development. Involving collaborative
efforts among physicians, quality experts and insurers, it is part
of an effort “to fundamentally restructure the delivery of
health care in North Carolina” in accordance with best practices.
Interestingly, none of the press stories reveal the chronic, traditional
anxiety-driven provider arguments with respect to potential malpractice
liability which could emerge from the adoption of these guidelines.
Perhaps we are finally getting to the enlightened understanding that
doing the right thing will actually potentially prevent both malpractice
claims and exacerbated illnesses --- the point of standardizing care
in the first place.
When the privacy regulations
were first adopted back in 2003, there was considerable anxiety among
the provider community,
and particularly physicians, with regard to the administrative burden
of compliance and intrusion in the doctor-patient relationship that
would come from the empowerment of patients to complain to the Office
of Civil Rights regarding violation of their right to privacy. The
OCR has now published data regarding enforcement of HIPAA
privacy complaints
and there can be no doubt that the number of complaints has indeed
gone up substantially. In 2004, the first full year of the program,
there were 6500 complaints filed. By 2007, that number had increased
to more than 8100. But this is the grand total of all complaints
received from all sources throughout the United States of America!
Hardly a tsunami of privacy violations. The data on the website reports
complaints filed by state and their resolutions. Although the ratios
have changed slightly, more cases are determined to have no violation
today, than four years ago. By far, most of the complaints are resolved
on investigation and review and do not proceed further (69%). Of
the cases that proceeded to investigation, last year produced almost
1500 ‘corrective actions’ (type unspecified) and a larger
number (750) than before were found to have no violations.
Medicare has paid for services ‘incident-to’ physician
services since the advent of the program in 1966. As the complexity
of medical office practice has increased, there are many more types
of clinicians who might interact with a patient in the office setting.
The application of ‘incident-to’ principles has proven
ambiguous, confusing and daunting to many physician practices. Now,
similar to their purchased services debacle, a 23 page Transmittal
that would have been effective June 2, 2008 has been rescinded. It
imposed new documentation requirements and many aspects of the delivery
of care left to carrier discretion in accordance with unarticulated
standards. “Incident-to” remains in effect. The ‘incident-to’ rules
offer an additional topic to be carefully incorporated into all physician
practice compliance programs.
The ability to get proper on call coverage for the hospital emergency
department is a growing challenge for community hospitals as documented
by the Center for
Health System Change.
Specialist physicians have become increasingly fearful of serving
on the on-call rotation given increased liability and larger numbers
of indigent and uninsured patients. Medical staffs around the country
have reduced the requirements for physicians on the medical staff
to perform this function, which long was seen as the physician’s
professional responsibility, which in earlier times they fulfilled
without much complaint. To cope with this problem, hospitals have
developed a range of strategies which the center identifies in their
report. Now, for the first time, the OIG
has issued an advisory opinion
explicitly approving an on-call and indigent coverage program to
pay members of the medical staff for performing these services. Some
have declaimed the safeguards this hospital established as unwieldy
and impractical, but the good news is that the OIG has acknowledged
this critical dilemma. They are still confused, I think, over the
role of the medical staff and that most bylaws no longer require
most categories of the staff to provide coverage. And, the EMTALA
liabilities to make sure coverage is available are the hospital’s
and not the medical staff members’ unless they are on the on
call schedule. This is one of many ways in which hospitals can pay
physicians to do work on their behalf to the ultimate benefit of
their patients.
Clinical integration is a technique
by which independent physicians and group practices can relate to
one another for quality
and still
bargain collectively over price with managed care plans. Cited by
the FTC in virtually every settlement with IPAs and combinations
that bargained collusively over fees, the indicia of proper clinical
integration have not been well defined. Some settlements and one
Advisory Opinion, now
almost six years old, have staked out some of the turf, but most
of what the government has reviewed, it has always seemed, were activities
that have been motivated more by price than quality improvement.
The lack of clear guidance has led the American
Hospital Association to call on the FTC and DOJ for greater specificity
in describing what would qualify as good clinical integration. Now,
in their advisory
opinion to the Greater Rochester IPA,
the FTC has described a program which seems far more to emanate from
a quality impetus. Because GRIPA was well integrated clinically for
the work it did in connection with HMO products, it had a relatively
easier time orienting its activities to the PPO, fee for service,
business where the antitrust risks are far greater. The opinion is
a useful statement of one modern model of clinical integration.
The recent change in the JCAHO
Medical Staff Standard 1.20
to require that the medical staff bylaws be an integrated document
has created a firestorm of controversy that should be less than a
tempest in a teapot. Prediction of expensive disasters in redrafting
bylaws, and arguing over what is process versus what is procedure,
is absurd and fomented by a cadre of law firms who have made significant
income from advising medical staffs and hospitals that the bylaws
should be divided up into five different sections so that they may
be more easily amended. The Medical Staff Bylaws are the Constitution
of the Medical Staff and should be amended about as easily as the
US Constitution is amended. We have written and advised on medical
staff bylaws for more than 100 medical staffs all around the country
over the last 30 years, and this is not all we do, as it is for some
firms. We have never advised a medical staff to disaggregate their
bylaws.
The other noteworthy change adopted by the JCAHO for 2009 is that
the medical staff should have the right to propose medical staff
bylaws changes directly to the board. This should be non-threatening
unless you have a renegade medical staff or a renegade medical executive
committee where the representative function of the MEC has broken
down. It would be the board’s responsibility to sort this out
if the medical staff asked for changes, not recommended by the MEC,
that were not in the best interests of the hospital. Everyone should
calm down about these feared power struggles and focus on the real
purpose of the medical staff, which is to be responsible for quality
in the institution. When organizations do that effectively the medical
staff can become more galvanized for a far better purpose than internal
turf and power struggles.
In October 2007, the US Attorney in New Jersey entered
into deferred prosecution as well as settlement agreements with six
device manufacturers
who had paid physicians purportedly to advise them regarding the
development
of new devices.
Unfortunately, many of these were apparently no show jobs. But in
reading the settlements and corporate integrity agreements, while
the manufacturers agreed to cease what the government found to be
illegitimate relationships with physicians, the government did recognize
that paying no more than $500 an hour to physicians to perform real
services advising these companies would be permitted. This specifically
acknowledges that device manufacturers do have a legitimate need
for input from practicing physicians who might use their products.
There are many myths about how device manufacturers and physicians
may relate to each other. In “Physician
Investment in Start-Up Device Companies: Debunking The Myths”, Alice presents the boundaries of safety and a continuum of arrangements
between
physicians and device manufacturers.
The last five years have heard
a relentless call for information technology dissemination to improve
quality and lower costs in health
care. Electronic health records (EHR) have been touted as the first
and most important step to a real technology revolution. For physicians,
though, the cost of EHR implementation has often proven prohibitive.
The Stark and anti-kickback protections for donated medical records
was expected to jumpstart this effort. Not so fast. In his consideration
of downstreamed
EHR licenses Dan
Shay takes his primer
on EHR license agreements a
step further in explicating the special complications of tri-partite
license agreements. What
happens on termination is at least as important as what is entailed
in implementation.
Alice Gosfield and James Reinertsen
MD have been working on techniques to help physicians and hospitals
work better together
to improve
quality. In their white
paper for IHI and
their two day programs
for IHI
as well as other
offerings,
they describe a six step plan to accomplish improved engagement around
quality. Now, in “Sharing
the Quality Agenda with Physicians ”,
they focus explicitly on the unique responsibility of lay
trustees to create more effective physician engagement with hospitals.
They explain how the board can ask the right questions and seek
the right
data to make engagement and quality strides effective and real. They
emphasize the importance of meeting the varying needs of different
segments of the medical staff and describe Stark compliant initiatives
that should be considered.
Pay for performance programs
show no signs of abating in popularity, yet their impact remains
equivocal. Whether quality would be better
if physicians within groups also paid themselves based on quality
performance is unknown. If the incentives of P4P are to have impact,
how are those monies distributed to the individual physicians once
the group gets paid? There is virtually nothing in the literature
on point. In “Physician
Compensation for Quality: Behind The Group’s Green Door ,” Alice
looks at the data on P4P programs, the basics of traditional compensation
within groups
and then presents the findings from a unique survey which was sent
out on her behalf by the AMGA producing responses from 14 groups
around the country who are variably paying for quality as part of
physician compensation. Some report significant improvement in quality
performance too. Alice then looks at the payment reform models on
the horizon and concludes that traditional notions of productivity,
on which most current group compensation models turn, will not reward
what the new systems, and most particularly the PROMETHEUS Payment® model
(www.prometheuspayment.org)
is designed to generate. She examines whether the Stark rules on
compensation will be a barrier to changed,
creative approaches, concludes that it will not, and then looks at
what employment contracts will have to accommodate to make physician
compensation for quality within groups real and of value
to both patients and physicians.
The most astonishing
reimbursement development of 2007 was a major change in the rules
regarding the
prohibition
on the markup of diagnostic testing. The
provision was originally to be effective January 1, 2008, but on
January 3, 2008 CMS forestalled its effect except for anatomic
pathology services and the old version of purchased technical components
which had been in effect for 19 years. A statutory prohibition on
testing markup was first enacted by Congress in 1988(!). HCFA and
now CMS have never really defined what a purchased service is. Most
sophisticated lawyers assumed that ‘a girl and a gizmo per
click’ was the essential definition of a purchased technical
component. The penalty for marking up is $2000 per improper claim!!
Until these final rules, the only discussion of a ‘purchased’ professional
component was in the reassignment rules which have long provided
that only an imaging center was really in a position to ‘purchase’ an
interpretation. If the components were purchased, the interpreting
physician did not have to complete an 855R and join the reassignment
account because the center would purchase study by study. The Stark
rules say that an independent contractor physician is only ‘in
the group’ for purposes of referring for studies, supervising
them and rendering designated health services (DHS), when they are
on the premises of the group. Still, under Stark, groups could share
facilities on block time leases, as long as they met the rules on
co-location of offices where they rendered non-designated health
services [See our AGG
Notes, May 2004],
or they could maintain their designated health services in stand
alone facilities which
they owned or controlled 24/7. If they proceed with the rules as
drafted, those Stark rules would be applicable to whether services
can be provided in those settings, but the new rules would affect
price.
CMS has defined whether a service is subject to the prohibition
on markup by reference to the location where it is provided. It doesn’t
matter who owns the equipment, who employs the personnel, whether
they are full-time, part-time, W-2 or independent contractors or
even if they have reassigned on an 855R! To avoid the markup prohibition
the service must be provided in office space of the billing physician
organization where the group or the physician provides substantially
the full range of services offered by the organization. Unless the
service is ‘purchased’ (still undefined) the claim must
show the lower of the fee schedule amount or the actual acquisition
charge, whichever is less. Where there is no per click charge, the
billing practice must determine the ‘net charge’ to submit
to Medicare. CMS has steadfastly refused to give any guidance on
how to calculate it, saying the burden is entirely on the billing
entity. CMS suggests, though, that one might want to consider figuring
out the net charge by dividing up the technician’s pro rata
salary or hourly rate across the number of studies done. Of course,
since these rules pertain to all diagnostic testing including Stark
DHS, this approach would vitiate the centralized building opportunity
under the Stark statute. Unless the group has co-located offices
where they do substantially the full range of services they do, the
services are subject to the prohibition on markup even if they own
the building, the equipment, the tech and/or the physicians! CMS
first proposed exactly the same standard under Stark and then ended
up using the hourly co-location for shared facilities. Until January
1, 2009., pending their 12 months to study the issue, the current
Stark rules will work just fine.
Many mobile arrangements where specialists lease their equipment
and technicians to primary care practices can work well under both
sets of rules. Many other arrangements where specialists lease space
in the same building as referring physicians would have to be changed
under the pending rules because those transactions create a study
subject to anti-markup unless the group provides substantially the
full range of services at the off-site location. Although they are
now delayed, the rules would not prohibit arrangements. They simply
take the fee schedule based reimbursement system that Congress created
in 1992 and turn it into a cost-based system. The rules are only
about pricing and not about anything else.
The Social Security Act has long had on the books
a provision which states that an entity may be excluded for charging
Medicare ‘substantially in excess’ of its usual charge.
Many people think this is a provision which requires that all charges
to all payors be the same as Medicare charges, which is not true.
The statutory provision made some sense in the old reasonable charge
reimbursement days when the Medicare allowable amount was calculated
on the basis of reference to the ‘usual, customary and reasonable’ charge.
With the advent of RBRVS and the Fee Schedule, Medicare no longer
calculates ‘usual charges’. Almost four years ago in
September, 2003, the OIG proposed regulations which attempted to
interpret the statute. They had major problems, and the only thing
good in them was that they took the position the provision did not
apply to charges for physician services. The OIG has now withdrawn
the proposed regulations with no plans to reissue them. Even so,
they state an intention to continue to monitor “individuals
and entities” for violations, impliedly recasting the specter
of evaluating physicians against this standard. The statutory provision
remains on the books, available for interpretation by the government
with no guidance to the industry. As a practical matter, the provision
comes into play when physicians and other providers enter into discounted
relationships which become a significant portion of their revenue
stream. When that happens, the statutory exclusion could be triggered.
So, while we have no standard for what constitutes a ‘usual’ charge,
but by definition it entails something relatively frequent. Our standard
advice has been that when your discounted business (by comparison
with what you charge Medicare) rises to 45% of your payor mix, your
discounted charge is approaching something ‘usual’. As
to “substantially in excess”, the proposed rules used
120% of the Medicare charge, but that has now been withdrawn.
Beginning in 1999 and completed by 2006, CMS has gradually
transferred the responsibility for detecting and deterring fraud
and abuse in Medicare from carriers and fiscal intermediary fraud
units to Program Safeguard Contractors (PSCs). If you get a letter
from one of these entities, look carefully at the bottom. It will
appear to come from CMS but it will not have the name of your usual
carrier or fiscal intermediary. The OIG has recently evaluated
the performance of these entities in the primary activities of
investigations, case referrals to law enforcement and proactive data
analysis. The PSCs
are expected “to be innovative and effective in data analysis,
moving beyond the capabilities of carrier and fiscal intermediary
fraud units.” The PSCs proved wildly variable in the intensity
of their activities. For 2005, on the Part A side, each one reviewed
produced between 5 and 449 investigations, while on the Part B side
they initiated between 18 and a whopping 3707 investigations, with
a median of 196. While the Program Integrity Manual emphasizes data
analysis as the primary technique to identify targets for fraud and
abuse investigation, the OIG found that only 18% of the PSCs were
doing so. What does this mean? The OIG has recommended better reporting
of PSC activities to CMS. This means they will increase their level
of activity because they will be measured on it. CMS has said it
will allocate budgets based on activity levels. These contractors
are in business to make money, so increased activity means they can
make more money, so they will increase their activity. Post-payment
audits which produce overpayments are a primary focus of the PSCs
for Part B. You should expect more of them. In addition to sounding
the bell to review and evaluate documentation and billing, because
analysis of data will drive much of what they do, a practical step
is for every physician practice to make sure that each physician
within it is carried under the right specialty for his or her practice.
If an internist is really doing cardiology, the likelihood of data
aberrancies by comparison to internal medicine peers will increase.
There are about 55 specialties recognized by Medicare. Being listed
in the wrong way can produce far closer scrutiny.
Virtually undiscussed in the literature is
a recent (April 2007)
GAO
report on how a focus by Medicare on physician
practice patterns could lead to greater “program efficiency”.
That phrase is redolent of the commercial payor movement to tiered
networks, episode treatment groups (ETGs) and other ways to determine
which providers are the cheapest
at rendering appropriate care.
The GAO focused on outlier generalist physicians who treat a disproportionate
share of overly expensive patients. These physicians saw similar
numbers of patients as others but, by comparison with their peers,
were more likely to admit to the hospital, more likely to generate
multiple admissions per patient and were more likely to have used
home health services but less likely to have been admitted to a skilled
nursing facility. The GAO explicitly looked at how ten private health
care purchasers are tracking efficiency, reporting that all compared
actual spending for physicians’ patients to expected spending
for the same patients, given their clinical and demographic characteristics.
The GAO called for legislation to give Medicare the ability to deploy
incentives used by other purchasers --- from steering patients to
more efficient physicians, to excluding inefficient physicians. As
Medicare is now implementing a widely criticized and administratively
burdensome ‘pay for reporting’ (not even pay for performance)
program,
it can be expected that efficiency measurement will make its way
into the Medicare toolkit as well.
This current expectation
should translate into an even greater motivation to pro-actively
prepare for better clinical collaboration such as that motivated
by the PROMETHEUS
Payment model®.
With the announcement of an initiative to launch September
2007, CMS will seek information from 500 hospitals nationwide about
physician investment in them. Of broader significance, however, they
will also be asking hospitals for disclosure of hospital-physician
compensation relationships under Stark. Half of the hospitals are
those who did not respond to a voluntary request for data. The others
will be chosen at random. In the announcement of the now mandatory
reporting,
the government makes it clear that the information can be used by
them for any legitimate purposes including enforcement. While this
announcement is a good reason for hospitals and physicians throughout
the country to review all such relationships for compliance, it is
not well understood that the Stark regulations offer both flexibility
and some opportunities for hospitals to pay physicians directly for
work they do for the hospital’s benefit. The Phase II regulations
made it clear that compensation for physician personal services provided
to the hospital has safe harbors which are specified in the definition
of ‘fair market value’. At the same time, the preface
to the regulations explicitly states that paying outside of the 50th
percentile of MGMA does not necessarily violate the law, although
safety is not guaranteed there.
Paying physicians for their time in helping the institution improve
its quality performance is increasingly important, as physicians
struggle against lowering reimbursement and higher overhead expenses.
Increasingly, hospitals are already paying for medical staff leadership
and committee service. As the activities for which physicians are
paid expand, the fundamental problem is that they can primarily be
paid for their time --- the one dear commodity they have little to
spare. There are, however, a host of things hospitals can provide
which benefit physicians and enhance both of their business cases,
while improving quality --- all without making cash payments to the
physicians. These are issues we have addressed in our articles in
Hospitals
and Health Networks Online (Part
1, Part
2), the Journal
of Oncology Practice ,
the IHI
White paper and
more. Some of our clients are also looking more closely at rewarding
the “good
citizenship” of their active medical staff members --- the
ones who attend meetings, and work on quality initiatives and help
the organization meet quality targets. Without paying for achievement
of good results (which patients expect of their hospitals and physicians
anyway), some hospitals are considering more innovative approaches:
when departments are working hard and achieving good quality scores,
they get departmental perks from flat screen TVs and free internet
access in the departmental doctors’ lounge, to a preferred
line for transcription or lab results, to concierge-type support
for their offices in the admission process. Some hospitals are offering
these ‘rewards’ to individual physicians whose services
contribute to high quality scores. None of these implicate the Stark
statute because they are not about providing physicians with a financial
benefit or service they would otherwise pay for themselves. These
are services specifically valuable to the hospital, but they give
the physicians back time. Using the compliance education regulatory
exception under Stark has become even more popular as the legal issues
associated with quality, including antitrust, PQRI and P4P, have
multiplied, along with more traditional concerns of false claims
liability and appropriate referral relationships. Hospitals can offer
(read ‘pay for’) educational programs to help physicians
learn to help themselves, as long as they physicians don’t
get CME for the program.
On December 5, 2006, Health
Affairs published a web exclusive series
of articles
offering some fascinating perspectives on hospital-physician relationships
which are particularly relevant to physician engagement with hospitals
around quality. Berenson, Ginsburg and May observe that physicians
have increasingly become competitors of the hospitals which were
formerly their most valued “significant others”. Fischer,
et al. argue that hospital quality results should be measured to
include the “extended hospital medical staff” which would
take in physicians who refer to the facility but never set foot in
it. Wilensky, Wolter, and Fischer present a new spin on gainsharing
as a way to meet the ever elusive goal of “aligned incentives”.
Smithson and Baker contend that the medical staff organization itself
is a moribund anomaly and not worth accommodating at all. Goldsmith
offers a view of the medical staff as a Darwinian coral reef with
predators and prey; while Cortese and Smoldt claim that legally integrated
hospital-physician entities are the only hope for the future.
The provocative juxtaposition of these articles reflects the intensity
of interest in the intersection of physicians’ economic behavior
with the hospital’s status as an institution where most of
the activities are driven by physician orders. All acknowledge that
improved medical staff-hospital relationships are indispensable in
today’s world.
Our work takes the position that the structure of these relationships
is not the issue at all. Too much time of lawyers and accountants
is spent constructing financial transactions that will bond the physicians
to the hospital by generating revenue for them. There is no question
that paying them for some activities is useful. Rebuilding trust
where it has broken can sometimes begin with a good business deal.
But, from the IHI
program and white
paper ,
to “Doing
Well By Doing Good ”
going back through a host of other publications including the AMA
White Paper from 1998, our
view is that most physicians have a profound interest in quality,
particularly in terms of outcomes for their patients and efficiency
in the use of their time. The holy grail of “aligned incentives” and
structure-driven solutions can only offer short-lived hope unless
these efforts recognize that physicians themselves are increasingly
reported on for their quality results, risk fraud and abuse enforcement
for quality failures, and have a strong cultural concern for excellence
and professionalism. All combine to define their business case for
quality which must be the fulcrum to better relationships with hospitals
if they are to be sustainable.
The increasing emphasis on quality
as a basis for fraud and abuse enforcement is now clear. Yet many
compliance officers are not integrated
into the quality activities of the organizations they serve. In her
viewpoint on “Doing
What Really Matters: The Compliance Connection to Quality ”
in the Journal of Health Care Compliance, Alice presents three activities
through which compliance officers
can work more effectively on quality issues in addition to the fundamental
challenge of raising the consciousness of the board and administration
of any healthcare entity to these new quality mandates.
Among the many strategies for closer alignment between hospitals
and their physicians are the proliferating joint ventures and financially
driven exercises, including gainsharing, that are intended to capture
with more revenues the loyalty of the medical staff members who are
involved. In an editorial in a recent issue of the Journal of Oncology, “Physician-Hospital
Partnerships: What Really Counts? ”, Alice argues
that unless the quality implications of hospital-physician ventures
are
their driving purpose, these transactions may generate short-term
revenues, but they will not feed the core needs of their participants.
Still, they may have an important role within the context of a well-thought
out physician engagement strategy.
The PROMETHEUS Payment® model is designed
explicitly to reward clinical collaboration among otherwise independent
providers. Since 30% of
any provider’s scores will turn on the performance of all the
other providers treating the patient for that condition, and scores
determine the totality of the payment a provider can receive, there
is a real reason to pay attention to the web of referral relationships – from
whom you take referrals, to whom and where you refer. Even when the
optimal moment for referral occurs would be an important point for
agreement among clinicians – whether primary care to specialty,
vice versa or among specialists. In fact, much of what PROMETHEUS
Payment® would reward, providers should be doing anyway. In her article “ A
New Payment Model for Quality: Why Care Now?” Alice
articulates some of the steps providers should be taking anyway to
improve their
care and their efficiency.
The interest of federal prosecutors in quality
has never been as intense as it is today. As a dramatic manifestation
of prosecutorial focus on board responsibility for hospital quality
generally and “the quality we are paying for,” attached
is a PowerPoint presentation created by James G. Sheehan,
Associate Attorney in the U.S. Attorney’s Office of Philadelphia.
You will note that, as in many prior instances, he is identifying
both
specific cases that will be models for future prosecutions as
well as upcoming new approaches to prosecution. He has always
followed
through on such public statements. All hospitals should take
heed.
In the late 1970’s, the concept of independent physiology
laboratories (IPLs) was created by an Attorney General opinion to
permit otherwise unrecognized providers to bill Medicare for the
delivery of non-invasive diagnostic services that did not qualify
as clinical laboratory services. Over the years, IPLs proliferated
with virtually no quality controls over them. In 1997, HCFA published
regulations creating independent diagnostic testing facilities (IDTFs)
with quality controls to make sure Medicare beneficiaries would not
be harmed. From 2000-2006, in California alone there was a forty
percent (40%) increase in the number of IDTFs and a four hundred
percent (400%) increase in the provider numbers billing for these
services. As a result, the government has now established almost
a dozen performance standards for IDTFs. Since physician practices
may hold numbers both to submit as physicians and as IDTFs all should
evaluate the new requirements. Interestingly, in addition to relatively
standard types of controls such as maintaining liability insurance,
assuring that equipment is at a physical location, answering beneficiary
complaints, posting regulatory standards for patients to see, testing
and calibrating equipment, and disclosing with regard to ownership,
the standards now say that physicians supervising may not supervise
more than three IDTF sites and the IDTFs may only provide services
upon an authorized practitioner’s request. Patient Self-referred
services are not covered. This change represents an increasing attention
by the government to the appropriateness of care both in terms of
efficiency and quality.
With the crisis regarding the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) creating
a significant reduction in physician reimbursement under Medicare
for 2007, Congress enacted the Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006.
While Congress froze payment rates to 2006 levels, they also created
a program to provide bonuses for physicians to report on
consensus based quality measures. The first measures would be those used in
the Physician Voluntary Reporting Program until the end of 2007. After that the measures will be specialty
focused and consensus based, meaning endorsed by a national organization
such as the Ambulatory Quality Alliance or the National Quality Forum.
The standards apply to physicians, non-physician practitioners, and
physical and occupational therapists. The bonus of 1.5% of allowed
charges for satisfactory professional service reporting will give
physicians more of a reason to pay attention to what their specialty
acknowledges as legitimate measures of quality. There are no appeals
of the determinations that the Secretary makes on this payment and
there will be sampling to validate the program. The system need not
be implemented by regulation but may be implemented through program
memoranda. These are easily accessed through the CMS website (when
it is working).
When Congress appropriates $1.35
billion dollars for physician quality improvement initiatives,
the federal government is getting serious about quality. Section
204 of the Medicare Improvements and Expansion
Act of 2006 created a demonstration project to evaluate the viability
of the “medical home” concept sponsored by the American
College of Physicians and the American Academy of Family Physicians
for primary care physicians to coordinate care on quality
issues. At the same time, under
Section 203, the OIG was called on to report in two years on “never
events” (e.g. amputating the wrong leg, operating on the wrong
patient) which the National
Quality Forum
has identified as errors that should never happen. The issue for
the government is how to avoid paying for these events and to what
extent payment is denied. For example, if the wrong leg is amputated,
should only the hospital not be paid or also the anesthesiologist
and the surgeon who participated? These questions have no answers
yet, but the Congressional focus on these issues brings Medicare
far more in line with the direction private industry has been moving,
and much faster than has typically been the case.
Implementation of the PROMETHEUS Payment® model
is progressing. With sponsorship from the Commonwealth Fund to model
Evidence-informed
Case Rates™, the program expects to launch in the latter part
of 2007. To make it real, there are contractual issues that must
be addressed including what is appealable and what is not. In her
2007 Health Law Handbook chapter Alice provides “The
PROMETHEUS Payment® Program: A Legal Blueprint”
which outlines not only contractual terms but also potential liability
and data
issues associated with PROMETHEUS Payment® implementation.
Quality is increasingly
becoming part of the basis on which providers compete. While advertising
about quality really
began with managed care organizations, it has now spread to many
hospitals and increasingly will be of interest to physicians. The
issues associated with physician advertising, including trademark,
liability and branding concerns, are addressed by Daniel Shay in
his 2007 Health Law Handbook chapter “Four
Out of Five Doctors Need to Know: Legalities of Physician Advertising.”
These matters are of increasing concern to our clients, beginning
with the plethora of generic names which they use to describe themselves.
Diagnostic testing services all over the country call themselves “Cardiac
Diagnostic Services”, “Diagnostic Cardiology Services”,
and the like. Similarly “Cardiovascular Associates”, “Cardiovascular
Consultants” and “Cardiology Consultants” can be
found in every state. This is not smart marketing. There is no question
that consumers get confused and contact the wrong providers. Savvy
physician groups will look at Daniel’s article.
One of the critical challenges for hospitals and physicians looking
to successful futures is their ability to work together to meet their
patients’ needs. The internationally renowned Institute for
Healthcare Improvement has, under the leadership of James L. Reinertsen,
M.D., launched its first ever program oriented around physicians. “Engaging
With Physicians In A Shared Quality Agenda” is a
two day in-person program first offered September 8-9, 2008 in which
Alice
Gosfield
is part of the four person faculty. It sold
out six weeks before its scheduled presentation. A new program has
been added to the agenda July 13th and 14th in San Francisco. The
program establishes a framework to plan and execute successful physician
engagement around quality. Jim and Alice are also
available to present
their parts of this program outside of the IHI
context. The core principle here is that hospitals will
fare far better if they organize more around engaging effectively
in the physicians’ quality agenda.
The Ventura County California hospital-medical
staff case generated a firestorm of controversy regarding board involvement
in medical
staff governance before it was eventually settled. The parties
had very intense views regarding the matters at hand. (See
the views expressed by the the attorneys
representing the physicians).
Subject to significant physician advocacy, the California legislature
enacted a law establishing the medical staff’s right
of self-governance in the most explicit terms ever . Specific
topics statutorily reserved to the medical staff include selection
of clinical criteria
and
standards to oversee and manage quality assurance and other medical
staff activities,
selection and removal of medical staff officers, and the right
to retain and be represented by independent legal counsel. In case
of
any dispute on these issues, the medical staff and hospital governing
board are obligated to meet and confer in good faith to resolve
the dispute. Astonishingly, though, the statute says that when
any person
or entity is even about to engage in acts or practices that hinder,
restrict or obstruct the ability of the medical staff to exercise
its rights, the superior court “on application of the medical
staff” may issue an injunction. (West’s Ann. Cal. Bus. & Prof
Code §2282.5). While acknowledging the ultimate authority
of the hospital board to protect the quality of medical care and
competency
of its medical staff, the legislature explicitly stated that their
final authority may only be exercised with a reasonable and good
faith belief that the medical staff has failed to fulfill a substantive
duty pertaining to quality of patient care.
Many commentators have characterized this legislation as establishing
that the medical staff must be considered an independent legal entity.
For many reasons this would be a disaster, although there are physician
advocates that have long called for this approach in the form of
incorporating the medical staff. Certainly the medical staff counsel
in the Ventura case makes that argument. We do not read the statute
as requiring that the medical staff be seen as an independent entity
and will be keenly interested in how it is interpreted by the courts.
The new possibilities for liability where a medical staff is separately
incorporated are significant: If it will then be able to conspire
with the hospital board under antitrust principles pertaining to
credentialing. It will have its own separate malpractice liability
for negligent credentialing. It would not be protected under the
hospital’s own director and officer’s liability insurance
but rather would have to obtain its own. The full interpretation
of the statutory provision is not yet known; but for medical staffs
which act responsibly to surveil the quality of care in the organizations
to which they direct their attention, the decision to incorporate
should not be lightly taken. While ‘bad cases make bad law’,
the essence of this law is not bad. It’s interpretation in
already difficult circumstances could create serious consequences.
In the last analysis, the extremely critical role of the organized
medical staff for quality assurance and particularly among their
peers, is strongly supported here. How to change the way medical
staffs and hospitals interact around quality is the key challenge
for hospitals of the future and a substantial theme in our work.
(See “In
Common Cause for Quality”, “Engaging
Physicians in a Shared Quality Agenda”, “W(h)ither
Medical Staffs?” and more throughout Latest Issues and
in Publications
The issue of how physicians can collaborate effectively
when two specialties seek to perform the same services has presented
increasing
challenges in many contexts. A classic problem area with regard to
this is the advent of coronary computerized tomographic angiography
(CTAs) performed by cardiologists who generally do not read the full
chest cavity. In contrast, radiologists frequently hold exclusive
privileges at the hospitals at which they practice and are not as
intensely focused on cardiac organs. The American College of Radiology
asked us to provide them with a white paper elucidating potential
reimbursement liabilities associated with splitting these interpretations.
That white
paper is
now available addressing these issues, all of which would be obviated
with the advent of PROMETHEUS Payment®.
Hospitals and physicians have
tried to collaborate more effectively through bonding, purchasing,
owning and managing.
Virtually none of these initiatives has improved quality of care.
In addition, the rise in economic credentialing, conflicts of interest
policies and disclosure of ‘competing investments’ further
entrenches the parties as disparate stakeholders. In her work with
hospitals and physicians in common cause for quality, Alice Gosfield
has focused on the negative effect of these initiatives. Frequently,
overly conservative attorneys contribute to mythologies pertaining
to the impact of Stark and the anti-kickback statute on these issues.
In an article jointly written with Jim Reinertsen, M.D., for Hospitals & Health
Networks Online,
they debunk these myths and offer strategies for more collaborative,
quality-enhancing relationships. The second
part of the presentation describes how PROMETHEUS Payment® can
further these relationships by supporting with a different payment
system efforts that hospitals and physicians ought to be involved
in any way.
In the 2007 Medicare Fee Schedule, the interrelationship
between the Stark in-office ancillary services exception and the
Medicare reassignment rule has been elucidated where the government
has emphasized and focused attention on fragmented joint ventures
(e.g. “pod” clinical laboratories) structured by attorneys
who have not understood that the Stark rules trump the reassignment
liberalizations. For any Stark designated health service,
no matter what the other reimbursement rules, the Stark rules are
the first
hurdle for compliance. Consequently, independent contractor relationships
that are generally allowed under the liberalized reassignment rules
will not meet the definition of in-office ancillary services since
an independent contractor is only in the group that is billing when
he uses their premises (e.g. radiologists reading off-site from the
group providing the technical component). We were not surprised by
this position since we believe that is what the rules have said all
along. However, the attention to these arrangements in the preface
to the Fee Schedule means that the government is becoming increasingly
aware of non-compliant creative solutions. Sometimes the answer is “you
just can’t do that”.
In its Work
Plan for 2007,
the Office of the Inspector General has indicated a far more refined
understanding of problematic areas in claims submission in the Medicare
program. Ranging from (a) medical necessity issues associated |