Clinical Integration and Bundled Payment
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act was enacted in 2005. It was three years before any regulations were published regarding who would qualify as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO) to which providers could report safety and quality data which would be protected from discovery in almost any setting. In thinking about the type of work that real clinical integration entails, those who engage in the required intense self scrutiny that is essential to change clinical processes to deliver safer, better, more valuable health care will have to generate highly sensitive data about their own performance. To invoke the protections of the law, the data must be generated within a Patient Safety Evaluation System (PSES) which is specific to the reporting provider. Providers include any kind of health facility or practitioner licensed or authorized under state law to provide health care services. Interestingly, providers do not include IPAs, PHOs or ACOs which are rarely licensed or authorized under state law to deliver care. This does not mean they are outside the bounds of the law. This means good lawyers can be creative about how to structure relationships between providers and these new delivery vehicles so that data can be protected through a PSES for reporting to a PSO.
When sensitive data is managed within this system, it cannot be introduced, discovered or used by anyone else in any federal, state or tribal court or administrative setting, subject to very limited exceptions. The law provides both a privilege enforced by the courts as well as broad confidentiality, the breach of which is enforced by the Office of Civil Rights of DHHS. It is both flexible and potentially sweeping in its effects. The system is reminiscent of the principles for tort reform that Alice set forth in an article in 2000. In "Physicians and Patient Safety Organizations: Furthering Clinical Integration" Alice presents the context for PSOs, what the regulations require for reporting to a PSO, what caselaw teaches us and then explores some ways in which deploying this mechanism can protect the hard work physicians will have to do to make their care better. This is an opportunity all physician groups and facilities should explore. It has the potential to bring to smaller entities the experiences and learning from others, thereby multiplying the power of engagement with the PSO. We will be working with our clients to help them develop their Patient Safety Evaluation Systems and the contracts with the PSOs to which they will report.
The drumbeat for insurers to move to value-based payments cannot be ignored. However, both experience and expertise at the health plans which are touting their programs are widely variable. A recent survey reports that 82% of health plans consider the development of new payment models a major priority. They are, however, all over the ballpark in what they are doing. Many of the national plans now claim to have many ACO projects in the works, although these vary widely as well. Almost all of the new value payment propositions that are not mere pay-for-performance turn on some concepts of bundling budgets or bundling payments. Typically, providers are paid in the ordinary course, with a gainsharing bonus available based upon reconciliation at some pre-determined point in time. The contracts that create these arrangements are the most critical foundation of potential success. As Medicare moved into this arena with the Bundled Payment for Care Initiative (BPCI) they engaged consultants to provide contracting advice. Mitre and Brookings acknowledge in the Foreword to their material their extensive reliance on Alice's input and review of their document. The Manual is oriented around the Medicare program, but essentially highlights what is necessary to make one of these bundled payment contracts work.
Bundled payment has been touted as the next, new aligned incentive payment model. Although rarely defined in the many discussions about it, bundled payment by definition combines two different providers, typically traditionally paid differently, into one budget or, in more radical versions, subject to a single prospective payment. Today's bundled payment models usually include an episode based payment. The Medicare ACO program anticipates a bundled payment model in its requirement that participating entities have the ability to allocate dollars to the disparate participants. In fact, though, in that program hospitals, physicians and others will be paid on a business as usual basis, and then, at the end of three years, if they have saved money over a benchmark there will be one payment to share. PROMETHEUS Payment offers a different model. If providers want to be paid separately, they are at risk together in a single budget, but PROMETHEUS Payment has a software program that can allocate savings appropriately to the diverse participating providers, based on good clinical practice guidelines which form the basis for the case rate. The incentives are the same, but the payment methods differ. Many commercial bundled payment and ACO programs follow the Medicare model. Herein lies the rub. Unless there are clear rules at the outset, providers may end up in the rancorous fights that characterized the few instances in the 1990s when PHOs received dollars, usually held by the hospital. CMMI asked Alice to present a technical assistance webinar for potential participants in their Medicare Bundled Payment Initiative on contractual and governance issues among providers in administering bundled payment models, and in "Avoiding Food Fights: The Value of Good Drafting to ACO Physician Participants" she elucidates the types of policy decisions that should be made today and documented governance documents and contracts among providers to avoid the problems of tomorrow. The third of our Three Tuesday Teleconferences addresses many of these issues with an opportunity for participants to ask questions.
Clinical integration has increasingly been discussed as the vehicle to accomplish what is necessary to be accountable for care. But even among those commentators who have gotten beyond the antitrust notions of clinical integration, few really describe the focus of change that can create a truly clinically integrated environment, nor how those changes can make a difference. For some time now, we have touted clinical integration as a way to reorganize clinical and administrative processes of care, particularly among physicians and the other clinicians who work with them, but also in relationship to hospitals. (See issues: #70, #67, #60) Now, Alice and Jim Reinertsen MD, have created a Clinical Integration Self Assessment tool which elucidates 17 distinct attributes of clinically integrated programs, whether within a physician group, by a hospital with its newly employed physicians, within the organized medical staff, or in a newly coalescing ACO-like entity. All ought to take into account the range of issues identified, but in slightly different ways. We are also explicitly calling for those who may use the tool, to revise, refine and add to it.
In her article in Medical Economics “Making Clinical Integration Work” Alice focuses on how clinical integration is meaningful to small physician practices. In their brief piece for the Health Forum, “Clinical Integration: Getting From Here to There” Alice and Jim Reinertsen focus on the hospital-physician nexus of clinical integration. Clinical integration of various kinds is going to be the sine qua non of health care delivery which will succeed in an environment of heightened quality expectations, the need for better patient safety, diminishing reimbursement, and pressure for contained costs.
The new environment makes it abundantly clear that physician engagement with hospitals will be essential to their ability to produce value. At the same time, physicians themselves will have to find new ways to clinically integrate within their own groups. Hospitals which have now moved significantly into the physician employment arena will have to figure out what to do with their physicians. In their new paper, “Achieving Clinical Integration with Highly Engaged Physicians” Alice Gosfield and Jim Reinertsen elucidate the new basis for common cause, contrast the current environment with past clinical integration efforts, and offer a new definition of clinical integration
“Physicians working together, systematically, with or without other organizations and professionals, to improve their collective ability to deliver high quality, safe, and valued care to their patients and communities.”
We offer four vibrant examples of very different programs where self-motivated physicians have clinically integrated. We reflect on the ways in which the organized medical staff can actually support and bolster clinical integration; and we introduce a new framework – the Four Fs – to help structure organized thinking about re-visioning the mission of the healthcare enterprise. This paper is a significant resource to our new program of the same title for the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, “Achieving Clinical Integration with Highly Engaged Physicians”. In the last analysis, this is an optimal moment for physicians to step up and take a leadership stance to improve care.
Clinical integration has been a vaguely understood topic since the antitrust regulators introduced the concept in 1996. Alice continues her focus on this issue in a new article which includes how clinical integration within groups may be an important first step before clinical integration with competitors or with hospitals. In “Clinical Integration Is Back” she observes that the furtherance of clinical collaboration across the continuum of care will be essential to improve healthcare delivery. A broader understanding of clinical integration techniques can enhance physician performance and quality results both with hospitals and on their own.
Pay for performance programs show no signs of abating in popularity, yet their impact remains equivocal. Whether quality would be better if physicians within groups also paid themselves based on quality performance is unknown. If the incentives of P4P are to have impact, how are those monies distributed to the individual physicians once the group gets paid? There is virtually nothing in the literature on point. In “Physician Compensation for Quality: Behind The Group’s Green Door,” Alice looks at the data on P4P programs, the basics of traditional compensation within groups and then presents the findings from a unique survey which was sent out on her behalf by the AMGA producing responses from 14 groups around the country who are variably paying for quality as part of physician compensation. Some report significant improvement in quality performance too. Alice then looks at the payment reform models on the horizon and concludes that traditional notions of productivity, on which most current group compensation models turn, will not reward what the new systems, and most particularly the PROMETHEUS Payment® model (www.prometheuspayment.org) is designed to generate. She examines whether the Stark rules on compensation will be a barrier to changed, creative approaches, concludes that it will not, and then looks at what employment contracts will have to accommodate to make physician compensation for quality within groups real and of value to both patients and physicians.
Clinical integration has been held out by the FTC in every physician network settlement into which they have entered in the last few years. "You can't do this, but if you were clinically integrated you could." Some have questioned whether clinical integration is really available as an option to facilitate providers bargaining with payors. Brown and Toland in California was the subject of an FTC enforcement action in 2003 for their PPO bargaining activities. When they eventually settled, they agreed not to undertake any PPO bargaining unless the FTC prior approved what they were doing as sufficient clinical integration. The FTC has now reviewed Brown and Toland's ( B & T) approach and has said it represents enough clinical integration to permit negotiations, but they will still be subject to review for conformity with the integration principles. B & T says that the elements of integration they have adopted are a utilization review program, disease management and case management activities and an electronic medical record. This is meaningful because until this point there has been only one advisory opinion which addressed acceptable elements of clinical integration and now the B & T program is different. The FTC says it will review their actual implementation; but this action stands for the proposition that clinical integration is alive and well. It also means clinical integration does not require a uniform approach consistent in every respect with the hypothetical facts set forth when its permissibility was first published by the FTC in 1996. We think that UFT-A offers an option which will, by its implementation, create appropriate clinical integration to qualify for joint bargaining.
One of the major thorns in the side of physicians confronting managed care payors has been their antitrust risk if they bargain for fees collectively. We have posited that ‘clinical integration’, which the antitrust regulators have said can permit otherwise collusive bargaining among competing physicians, is part of the business case for quality. In each of the physician and hospital network settlements in the last months, the FTC has noted that the physician groups were not sufficiently integrated financially or clinically. In the settlement with Brown and Toland, the FTC imposed a new requirement that if they chose to bargain based on clinical integration they would have to submit their approach to the FTC before implementation. Given the dearth of regulatory guidance on point, and only one advisory opinion to date, it is with great pleasure that we are able to make available an important article from our 2004 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK by Bob Leibenluft who was the head of the health care division of the FTC when the clinical integration opportunity was made available. In “Clinical Integration: Assessing the Antitrust Issues” Bob and his colleague Tracy Weir, acknowledge that the antitrust regulators have not seen much real clinical integration. We think that is probably true since much of what we are familiar with as purported to demonstrate clinical integration, in fact, does not go far enough. Still his article supports our case that doing what we suggest in our ‘unified field theory’ work would likely meet the regulators’ criteria.