Quality & Value
False claims liability has typically turned on financial behaviors -- upcoding, submitting claims pursuant to Stark or anti-kickback violations, and other financial arrangements, activities and transactions. Rarely considered are the increasingly new liabilities associated with what Alice calls “quality fraud.” These are improper clinical behaviors including wasteful services, medical errors, over-use, under-use, failed medical necessity and violation of basic requirements for payment that turn on clinical compliance. In addition, with the advent of value-based purchasing and significantly more reporting about quality, inaccurate or false reporting can create exposure as well. In “Quality Fraud: Gathering The Threads” Alice elucidates the multiple bases for quality fraud, what such fraud looks like as action, penalties associated with misbehaviors, the guidance the government has offered on point, and suggestions for avoiding these risks. Most providers-- including hospitals and physicians -- will have to update their compliance programs to address effectively these augmented perils.
Cancer care represents a major segment of health care expenditures in the USA and the payment to physicians has been perversely oriented around the drugs they administer rather than the services they perform in meeting the complex needs of their patients. Recent history has demonstrated multiple attempts at reforming this payment, including most recently in CMS’ Oncology Care Model which will become Oncology First Model after 2021. In “Paying Physicians for Cancer Care”, Alice explains the inception of this out of whack system, considers reform efforts in commercial payment, looks closely at the OCM and criticisms of it and then sets forth the principles which apply in a new design suggestion which has been presented to CMS. She also sets forth contractual issues to make cancer care payment viable. The new proposal, initially presented in a White Paper which set forth five principles for program design, also figured as the focus of a Health Affairs blog post and an interview with Alice and two other members of the design team.
As a tiny, boutique law firm, we were delighted that Acquisition International, based in the UK, named us the Leading Boutique Personal Service Health Law Firm of the Year chose to profile us and our approach to work because of our dedication to excellence. We strive to provide stellar service to our clients and to have collaborative relationships with them, for which we are willing to be held accountable in Our Attorney Client Compact. We have also been recognized for ten consecutive years as a Best Law Firm by Best Lawyers.
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act was enacted in 2005. It was three years before any regulations were published regarding who would qualify as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO) to which providers could report safety and quality data which would be protected from discovery in almost any setting. In thinking about the type of work that real clinical integration entails, those who engage in the required intense self scrutiny that is essential to change clinical processes to deliver safer, better, more valuable health care will have to generate highly sensitive data about their own performance. To invoke the protections of the law, the data must be generated within a Patient Safety Evaluation System (PSES) which is specific to the reporting provider. Providers include any kind of health facility or practitioner licensed or authorized under state law to provide health care services. Interestingly, providers do not include IPAs, PHOs or ACOs which are rarely licensed or authorized under state law to deliver care. This does not mean they are outside the bounds of the law. This means good lawyers can be creative about how to structure relationships between providers and these new delivery vehicles so that data can be protected through a PSES for reporting to a PSO.
When sensitive data is managed within this system, it cannot be introduced, discovered or used by anyone else in any federal, state or tribal court or administrative setting, subject to very limited exceptions. The law provides both a privilege enforced by the courts as well as broad confidentiality, the breach of which is enforced by the Office of Civil Rights of DHHS. It is both flexible and potentially sweeping in its effects. The system is reminiscent of the principles for tort reform that Alice set forth in an article in 2000. In "Physicians and Patient Safety Organizations: Furthering Clinical Integration" Alice presents the context for PSOs, what the regulations require for reporting to a PSO, what caselaw teaches us and then explores some ways in which deploying this mechanism can protect the hard work physicians will have to do to make their care better. This is an opportunity all physician groups and facilities should explore. It has the potential to bring to smaller entities the experiences and learning from others, thereby multiplying the power of engagement with the PSO. We will be working with our clients to help them develop their Patient Safety Evaluation Systems and the contracts with the PSOs to which they will report.
The drumbeat for insurers to move to value-based payments cannot be ignored. However, both experience and expertise at the health plans which are touting their programs are widely variable. A recent survey reports that 82% of health plans consider the development of new payment models a major priority. They are, however, all over the ballpark in what they are doing. Many of the national plans now claim to have many ACO projects in the works, although these vary widely as well. Almost all of the new value payment propositions that are not mere pay-for-performance turn on some concepts of bundling budgets or bundling payments. Typically, providers are paid in the ordinary course, with a gainsharing bonus available based upon reconciliation at some pre-determined point in time. The contracts that create these arrangements are the most critical foundation of potential success. As Medicare moved into this arena with the Bundled Payment for Care Initiative (BPCI) they engaged consultants to provide contracting advice. Mitre and Brookings acknowledge in the Foreword to their material their extensive reliance on Alice's input and review of their document. The Manual is oriented around the Medicare program, but essentially highlights what is necessary to make one of these bundled payment contracts work.
The rapid rise in the employment of physicians by health systems has been repeatedly noted. A recent survey by yet another recruitment company found that 70% of health care leaders say physicians are approaching them for employment. Yet, the data has also consistently shown that this is a money losing proposition for the hospitals in many ways, in part because once employed, the hospitals do not facilitate the physicians' clinical integration or undertake any effort to actually improve value [See also issues: #1: 61, 55, 48]. In "Four Top Complaints of Employed Doctors", newly employed physicians complain about (1) being "bossed around by less educated administrators;" (2) not being able to make decisions about staff and personnel; (3) having less authority over billing and charge coding; and (4) being forced to use new equipment and technology. In addition to the efficiencies of many of the organizations now employing physicians, the consolidation in the industry is raising other concerns with respect to provider power and negotiating with plans. It is not hard to imagine that many of the employment strategies will unravel. Whether physicians have prepared well in their negotiations with the hospital in the first place for life after a failed transaction is something that needs to be dealt with in the first place. More to the point, in many instances, health systems and hospitals can get precisely the same impact that they seek from employment without the troubles while physicians can function more effectively in their own environments. We have repeatedly stated this ("Alignment Without Servitude: Leasing the Practice to the Hospital"), and have facilitated many practices in a wide variety of affiliation strategies with hospitals and health systems that fall short of employment and "avoid marriage." [See also issues: #1: 54, 52, 47]
With the questions about the health reform legislation's constitutionality resolved, the pace of change in the provider community has accelerated. In a well documented, sweeping review of physician practice developments, with special attention to how physicians can remain independent, Jeff Goldsmith in his very interesting commissioned paper for the Physicians' Foundation looks at significant trends. These include rising costs for physician practices, widespread retirement of baby boomer physicians in the near term, and the ways in which health policy gives preference to hospital employment, which likely is unsustainable in current forms. Looking at The Future of Medical Practice and The Need to Innovate he offers examples of approaches including micro-practices, well supported IPAs, and groups which take professional services risk payments, among other innovations. He offers policy recommendations for change. He makes the case that hospital employed physicians are vastly less productive than their private practice colleagues and their financial performance lags substantially as well. He posits that many of the current arrangements will be unsustainable. We have been making the same points since 2009 as well as more recently.
We would take issue with his views of innovative payment initiatives though, since he does not address the PROMETHEUS Payment® model which does not give physicians insurance risk, but rather risk to manage care effectively. Not only that, but its budgets (Evidence-informed Case Rates®) begin with good, clinical practice guidelines. Jeff's arguments regarding financing the medical home don't go as far as what we have described as to how PROMETHEUS Payment can sustain the medical home. Physicians today are paid fee for service for a non-insulin dependent diabetic about $311 for a year of care. Using the PROMETHEUS Payment model, the same physician would be paid for the same patient for the same year of care $2329 AND the system would save substantial amounts of money currently spent on potentially avoidable complications. Physicians should learn about this!!!
New payment models are only part of the innovations physicians will have to adopt. We now offer a suite of useful tools that can be deployed by physicians in shaping their own new futures including (1) our two versions of the clinical integration self-assessment tool -- one for networks and the other for group practices, organized medical staffs or newly coalescing ACO-type organizations; (2) our Three Tuesday Teleconferences addressing leasing the practice, co-management, and bundled payments; (3) our teleconference on compensating physicians for quality and value as well as our articles on the subject. Physicians can be far more proactive in designing their futures. The moment is now.
Bundled payment has been touted as the next, new aligned incentive payment model. Although rarely defined in the many discussions about it, bundled payment by definition combines two different providers, typically traditionally paid differently, into one budget or, in more radical versions, subject to a single prospective payment. Today's bundled payment models usually include an episode based payment. The Medicare ACO program anticipates a bundled payment model in its requirement that participating entities have the ability to allocate dollars to the disparate participants. In fact, though, in that program hospitals, physicians and others will be paid on a business as usual basis, and then, at the end of three years, if they have saved money over a benchmark there will be one payment to share. PROMETHEUS Payment offers a different model. If providers want to be paid separately, they are at risk together in a single budget, but PROMETHEUS Payment has a software program that can allocate savings appropriately to the diverse participating providers, based on good clinical practice guidelines which form the basis for the case rate. The incentives are the same, but the payment methods differ. Many commercial bundled payment and ACO programs follow the Medicare model. Herein lies the rub. Unless there are clear rules at the outset, providers may end up in the rancorous fights that characterized the few instances in the 1990s when PHOs received dollars, usually held by the hospital. CMMI asked Alice to present a technical assistance webinar for potential participants in their Medicare Bundled Payment Initiative on contractual and governance issues among providers in administering bundled payment models, and in "Avoiding Food Fights: The Value of Good Drafting to ACO Physician Participants" she elucidates the types of policy decisions that should be made today and documented governance documents and contracts among providers to avoid the problems of tomorrow. The third of our Three Tuesday Teleconferences addresses many of these issues with an opportunity for participants to ask questions.
As the concept has unfolded from an article in Health Affairs in December 2006, we have expressed skepticism about the implementation of Medicare Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). The proposed regulations were met with resounding criticism throughout the industry from almost all sides; and the supporting statements, by the Federal Trade Commission on antitrust and the OIG on fraud and abuse, derided both as too restrictive and too lenient. Many forget that this program enacted as part of health reform was never intended to be applicable to most provider groups. At its best, CMS has estimated that 75-100 provider entities will be approved as ACOs.
We firmly believe this is a considerable over-estimate even if there is a complete revamping of the regulations. We are not alone. In “Onerous Regs Put ACOs on the Ropes” Alice and Jeff Goldsmith are the principal interviewees explaining why of the 5800 hospitals and more than 780,000 physicians in America, very few will find themselves in Medicare ACOs. That said, the pressures to be accountable for care and what that will require are an entirely different proposition. In “ACOs vs. Accountable Care: Is There A Difference?”, Alice further describes the problems with the Medicare approach, but elucidates the essential activities that are necessary to be accountable for care; and they are activities that providers should be engaged in even if no one pays them differently.
Clinical integration has increasingly been discussed as the vehicle to accomplish what is necessary to be accountable for care. But even among those commentators who have gotten beyond the antitrust notions of clinical integration, few really describe the focus of change that can create a truly clinically integrated environment, nor how those changes can make a difference. For some time now, we have touted clinical integration as a way to reorganize clinical and administrative processes of care, particularly among physicians and the other clinicians who work with them, but also in relationship to hospitals. (See issues: #70, #67, #60) Now, Alice and Jim Reinertsen MD, have created a Clinical Integration Self Assessment tool which elucidates 17 distinct attributes of clinically integrated programs, whether within a physician group, by a hospital with its newly employed physicians, within the organized medical staff, or in a newly coalescing ACO-like entity. All ought to take into account the range of issues identified, but in slightly different ways. We are also explicitly calling for those who may use the tool, to revise, refine and add to it.
In her article in Medical Economics “Making Clinical Integration Work” Alice focuses on how clinical integration is meaningful to small physician practices. In their brief piece for the Health Forum, “Clinical Integration: Getting From Here to There” Alice and Jim Reinertsen focus on the hospital-physician nexus of clinical integration. Clinical integration of various kinds is going to be the sine qua non of health care delivery which will succeed in an environment of heightened quality expectations, the need for better patient safety, diminishing reimbursement, and pressure for contained costs.
Hospital employment of physicians is occurring all over the country. Much of it is comes from completely misguided expectations. There are delusions and fantasies on both sides of these transactions. Physicians hurl themselves on the bosom of the hospital in the belief this will give them financial security while they will be left alone to practice, business as usual. Hospitals, for their part, think this will give them control over physicians, but they rarely do anything with them, particularly the specialists who have recently joined their fold. Many of the finances of these deals cannot work going forward as hospitals confront decreased reimbursement from Medicare and fewer admissions in a quality driven environment. We have confronted these issues before in articles addressing non-acquisition financial strategies between hospitals and physicians and on the right questions to ask and answer before leaping into these arrangements. We fully expect there to be unwinds of many of those transactions which are without content, given physician gripes about employment. That said, these arrangements can work. But the mere existence of a W-2 between the health system or hospital and the physician is not a viable, sustainable approach. Strategic goals, clear targets and benchmarks of behavior from both sides of the table are the only reasonable way for these transactions to add any real value in the changing system.
The new environment makes it abundantly clear that physician engagement with hospitals will be essential to their ability to produce value. At the same time, physicians themselves will have to find new ways to clinically integrate within their own groups. Hospitals which have now moved significantly into the physician employment arena will have to figure out what to do with their physicians. In their new paper, “Achieving Clinical Integration with Highly Engaged Physicians” Alice Gosfield and Jim Reinertsen elucidate the new basis for common cause, contrast the current environment with past clinical integration efforts, and offer a new definition of clinical integration
“Physicians working together, systematically, with or without other organizations and professionals, to improve their collective ability to deliver high quality, safe, and valued care to their patients and communities.”
We offer four vibrant examples of very different programs where self-motivated physicians have clinically integrated. We reflect on the ways in which the organized medical staff can actually support and bolster clinical integration; and we introduce a new framework – the Four Fs – to help structure organized thinking about re-visioning the mission of the healthcare enterprise. This paper is a significant resource to our new program of the same title for the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, “Achieving Clinical Integration with Highly Engaged Physicians”. In the last analysis, this is an optimal moment for physicians to step up and take a leadership stance to improve care.
Clinical integration has been a vaguely understood topic since the antitrust regulators introduced the concept in 1996. Alice continues her focus on this issue in a new article which includes how clinical integration within groups may be an important first step before clinical integration with competitors or with hospitals. In “Clinical Integration Is Back” she observes that the furtherance of clinical collaboration across the continuum of care will be essential to improve healthcare delivery. A broader understanding of clinical integration techniques can enhance physician performance and quality results both with hospitals and on their own.
As the concept of “Accountable Care Organizations” and moving to “The Clinic Model” have captured the fancies of a number of small and large hospital systems around the country, Alice with Jim Reinertsen, MD explores the real questions that should be asked and answered before health systems and physicians leap into these often ill-defined strategies. In their piece “Informed Consent to the Ties That Bind” , Alice and Jim describe specific points of evaluation, and offer good and bad answers to the tough questions. They raise issues that few of the consultants pushing these strategies are willing to address.
While specialists are seeking employment by health systems, health systems are forming multi-specialty groups and the billiard balls are repositioning themselves throughout the country, the illusion that health system employment of physicians will solve alignment problems going forward is unfortunately far too simplistic for the current state of affairs. In her new HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK chapter, “Avoiding Marriage: Hospital and Physician Non-Acquisition Financial Strategies” Alice examines these issues in greater depth than was presented in her teleconference. She explores the phenomenon of enthusiasm for full merger business strategies and offers a range of other techniques by which physicians and hospitals may bond more tightly while physicians remain independent---all with particular emphasis on improving healthcare value and quality.
Under the Stark statute and regulations, there are significant restrictions on how hospitals may pay physicians or provide financial benefit to them. In today’s environment of increased demand for quality performance, paying physicians for their contribution to hospital quality performance is increasingly a sought after technique. In the proposed update to the 2009 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS), CMS asked for comments on how they should approach gainsharing (“shared savings programs”) and quality performance payments (“incentive payment plans”). Alice responded with comments on the quality payments. We do not believe gainsharing programs are about quality. They are about saving hospitals money. They have a short shelf life, distract physicians from work they should be doing, and are not sustainable as a business model. We do not comment on them to the government, although we do advise clients who choose to implement them. Most of the programs which have been greenlighted by the OIG are so overloaded with safeguards and protections that they have relatively little utility, other than to the consultants whom the OIG apparently thinks are a protection in their structuring and review of these programs. Unfortunately, in their proposed regulations, the government failed to understand the very significant policy and operational differences between programs that pay physicians a portion of shared savings and programs which pay physicians for contributing to improved hospital quality performance as measured on nationally recognized bases.
When the time came to actually publish an exception that would address these issues, the regulators waffled. Instead they posed 55 specific questions about how to regulate these programs. There are many ways in which the Stark program is out of control and this is one of them. Admitting their lack of familiarity with quality measurement or improvement techniques, they called for answers to their questions, leaving the comment period open another ninety days into February. Alice has provided a 16 page response addressing quality performance payment programs, setting forth the minimal regulation that is necessary here to safeguard patients and protect against rewarding referrals. The government has to stop using the Stark statute as a vehicle for basic regulation of issues that are highly regulated already in other contexts.
The organized medical staff has a unique role in assuring the quality of care in hospitals. Yet the volunteer medical staff members are under unprecedented pressures which inhibit their willingness to take on tasks they traditionally have performed for free – whether medical staff leadership, service on committees, or on-call and indigent care coverage. Now, there is some data showing that throughout the country, there is an emerging bifurcation into alternate models of medical staff-hospital relationships. (See, Casalino et al, “Hospital-Physician Relations: Two Tracks And The Decline of the Voluntary Medical Staff”, Health Affairs (Sept 2008). Where in the era of post-failed Clinton health reform, hospitals bought primary care practices and then had to unload them, more and more hospitals today are acquiring specialist practices and employing specialist physicians. Equally present are the settings in which members of the medical staff go into competition with the hospital and cease to attend there as much as they used to, while they own and develop ambulatory surgery centers, imaging facilities and even whole specialty hospitals. What is the significance of this for medical staff governance and quality surveillance? These changes in organizational arrangements really ought to have little meaning to the functioning of the organized medical staff in relationship to the hospital board and administration with regard to its principal responsibilities for quality. The medical staff members, whether employed or independent or more typically a mix, still have a unique role in the hospital.
Some commentators have taken the position that the organized medical staff is obsolete if not moribund. We believe they may be wrong; although it is becoming increasingly important to consider carefully just what the function of the medical staff ought to be in the highest quality environments. If 20% of the medical staff is responsible for 80% of the hospital admissions, then who should be considered Active Staff with governance authority to make the rules for the interrelationships among all physicians? Who should define the quality culture for physicians? If the hospital employs the physicians and mandates their participation in activities that fundamentally do not interest them, what will be the outcome for patients? If the medical executive committee is focused on internecine warfare, endovascular food-fights and not how many hearses leave the hospital and why, what will the hospital do without a medical staff on whom it can rely to create a high quality environment? We think these are essential questions which merit the attention of hospitals, their boards and medical staff members. We do not believe that employment of medical staff members ensures an engaged medical staff which will work well on quality issues. We think that the current moment in quality policy and demand for demonstrated hospital quality performance offers an unprecedented opportunity to reinvigorate the role of the medical staff around issues that really matter.
The fraud and abuse liabilities which lurk in inadequate quality performance have been highlighted on this website since 2003 with an AGG Note and later Alice's article in The Journal of Health Care Compliance, “Doing What Matters.” From Jim Sheehan’s first public statements on his priorities regarding quality enforcement, to the first OIG settlement based on quality failures, to Sheehan’s 2006 PowerPoint enumerating the many ways in which quality will be the foundation for fraud enforcement, the weight of punitive attention is increasing. Now, with the OIG's published statements regarding Board responsibility for quality in hospital, and a major initiative on nursing home quality performance beginning with a joint publication with the Health Care Compliance Association the pace of the inexorable moves in this direction has quickened considerably. Those who ignore the risks do so at their own peril.
First convened in December 2004 as a disparate group of experts intending to design a new payment model, PROMETHEUS Payment® Inc., was awarded a $6.4 million grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, to develop a scorecard, refine the concepts and most importantly test the program in four pilot sites across the country. Having modeled its first Evidence-informed Case Rates™ for actual implementation beginning in 2009, the results are quite stunning. In her plain language article, “Making PROMETHEUS Payment® Rates Real: Ya’Gotta’ Start Somewhere” Alice explains the methodology of constructing the rates. First, she elucidates how the Design Team took into account its clear understanding that physicians would be suspicious of rates built on claims data. There are five specific financial cushions built into the rates. The result is that the care for a controlled non-insulin dependent diabetic, whose care comes primarily from a physician office, would be paid based just on the claims data at $311 a year; but, under the PROMETHEUS system, the same patient’s care would be eligible for $2329 to the physician!!! At the same time, what is most remarkable, is that this approach to the broad problem of delivering science based diabetes care would save the system represented in just the database we are using and this one condition, more than $340 million. This is a very powerful reason to move to the PROMETHEUS Payment® model. Similar results are emerging for the other conditions we will address initially as well. The more important hidden message in the article, though, is whether our specific program is implemented is not the issue. Throughout the American healthcare system, we are spending extraordinary amounts of money on potentially avoidable complications, while we are not paying providers enough to do what needs to be done to prevent those complications in the first place. Exploring which services the PROMETHEUS model considers to be potentially avoidable, and then analyzing how to avoid them, is a good way to think about how to organize clinical service delivery for better results with greater efficiency.
A case decided in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has taken the quality-payment nexus further without any “never event”, or a finding of fraud, or even a bad outcome to the patients involved. In Pinnacle Health System v. Department of Public Welfare (2008 WL 140985) the hospital appealed from payment denials affirmed by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. The Medicaid agency denied payment for psychiatric hospitalizations where the patients were not seen by a psychiatrist on a daily basis. The hospital argued there was no regulation requiring it. The agency argued that this failure caused care to fall below the regulatory requirement that care be rendered in accordance with "accepted medical treatment standards." Both sides had experts -- the hospital's testifying to the fact that daily visits were not medically necessary, the agency's that daily visits were the standard of care. While the standard of judicial review for administrative purposes was whether the determination by the agency was supported by substantial evidence, the court held that even though the standard of ‘accepted medical treatment standards’ was general, it was not improperly vague and did put providers on notice of what was expected of them.
Considering (1) standard managed care contract language regarding treatment in accordance with accepted standards of care, (2) the burgeoning expectations that American health care should be provided at higher levels than it is, (3) increasing fraud and abuse liability for quality failures and (4) that malpractice caselaw which addresses the standard of care has imposed as the standard of care treatment regimens not widely applied, the Pinnacle case offers a tightening view of the quality imperative. Without a finding of malpractice, fraud, or a “never event” payment denial for failure to deliver services properly is a new reason to do the right thing at the right time in the right way.
Pay for performance programs show no signs of abating in popularity, yet their impact remains equivocal. Whether quality would be better if physicians within groups also paid themselves based on quality performance is unknown. If the incentives of P4P are to have impact, how are those monies distributed to the individual physicians once the group gets paid? There is virtually nothing in the literature on point. In “Physician Compensation for Quality: Behind The Group’s Green Door,” Alice looks at the data on P4P programs, the basics of traditional compensation within groups and then presents the findings from a unique survey which was sent out on her behalf by the AMGA producing responses from 14 groups around the country who are variably paying for quality as part of physician compensation. Some report significant improvement in quality performance too. Alice then looks at the payment reform models on the horizon and concludes that traditional notions of productivity, on which most current group compensation models turn, will not reward what the new systems, and most particularly the PROMETHEUS Payment® model (www.prometheuspayment.org) is designed to generate. She examines whether the Stark rules on compensation will be a barrier to changed, creative approaches, concludes that it will not, and then looks at what employment contracts will have to accommodate to make physician compensation for quality within groups real and of value to both patients and physicians.
The PROMETHEUS Payment® model is designed explicitly to reward clinical collaboration among otherwise independent providers. Since 30% of any provider’s scores will turn on the performance of all the other providers treating the patient for that condition, and scores determine the totality of the payment a provider can receive, there is a real reason to pay attention to the web of referral relationships – from whom you take referrals, to whom and where you refer. Even when the optimal moment for referral occurs would be an important point for agreement among clinicians – whether primary care to specialty, vice versa or among specialists. In fact, much of what PROMETHEUS Payment® would reward, providers should be doing anyway. In her article “A New Payment Model for Quality: Why Care Now?” Alice articulates some of the steps providers should be taking anyway to improve their care and their efficiency.
Pay for performance, while a positive development in terms of focusing attention on the relationship between quality results and payment systems, cannot sustain itself as a business model. How PROMETHEUS Payment® addresses the shortcomings of P4P is important to understand. In addition, group practices are ideally suited to take on PROMETHEUS Payment®, but only if they also change their systems to be more efficient with measurable quality. In "Getting Beyond P4P: PROMETHEUS Payment® and Group Practice", Alice elucidates the potential positive nexus between the new payment model and group configurations.
In a blog interview conducted by a surgeon who has been a client, Alice is questioned about how she became a health lawyer, her views on P4P, why she didn't become a physician and more. For a real change of pace go to http://insidesurgery.com/.
As health plans and health systems have consolidated and fraud and abuse enforcement has intensified throughout healthcare, the natural business tendencies in any other industry for business partners to find ways to benefit each other economically in win-win strategies has been stifled in health care. Anxiety over fraud and abuse and antitrust risks, has gotten in the way of hospitals and physicians on one hand and health plans and physicians on the other working together for their mutual economic benefit with the purpose of improving quality. In a new chapter in the Health Law Handbook, Alice makes the argument that until the three principal drivers of the care that patients receive in this country take common ownership of the quality mission and stop thinking of themselves as disparate, adversarial stakeholders, quality will never advance to the levels we would like. "In Common Cause for Quality" she articulates a perspective on how to consider a business case for quality, sets forth the quality demands on hospitals and health plans which cannot be met without full cooperation of physicians and debunks the myths that the law impedes collaboration which benefits any party economically. She then enumerates 10 specific strategies by which hospitals and health plans can advance the physician's business case for quality through activities with direct beneficial financial impact on those physicians. She also presents 6 additional strategies through which physicians can and will have to help hospitals to optimize their quality efforts.
In "Enhancing Oncology's Business Case: How the Hospital Can Help" she presents a crisper version of these arguments in terms of how oncologists can safely look to their hospitals to help them with their own quality demands.
In an article in Community Oncology, Alice makes the argument that because of the perverse impact of the Medicare drug payment model on oncology practices, they have neglected to focus on their own business case for some time. When much of your income is driven by profits made on the provision of pharmaceuticals to patients, a reduction in that payment can result in significant practice dislocation. For oncologists, the moment may well be optimal to really consider clinical integration. In “Better Quality, Better Margins: Seizing the Moment” Alice elucidates these connections in relationship to the application of UFT-A principles.
Clinical integration has been held out by the FTC in every physician network settlement into which they have entered in the last few years. "You can't do this, but if you were clinically integrated you could." Some have questioned whether clinical integration is really available as an option to facilitate providers bargaining with payors. Brown and Toland in California was the subject of an FTC enforcement action in 2003 for their PPO bargaining activities. When they eventually settled, they agreed not to undertake any PPO bargaining unless the FTC prior approved what they were doing as sufficient clinical integration. The FTC has now reviewed Brown and Toland's ( B & T) approach and has said it represents enough clinical integration to permit negotiations, but they will still be subject to review for conformity with the integration principles. B & T says that the elements of integration they have adopted are a utilization review program, disease management and case management activities and an electronic medical record. This is meaningful because until this point there has been only one advisory opinion which addressed acceptable elements of clinical integration and now the B & T program is different. The FTC says it will review their actual implementation; but this action stands for the proposition that clinical integration is alive and well. It also means clinical integration does not require a uniform approach consistent in every respect with the hypothetical facts set forth when its permissibility was first published by the FTC in 1996. We think that UFT-A offers an option which will, by its implementation, create appropriate clinical integration to qualify for joint bargaining.
With the reemphasis on 'transparency' in health care quality policy, more and more quality information about providers will be made available. The commercial value of provider data is also increasing. Providers enter into many contractual relationships where data about them may be in play, even if that is not the focus of the relationship. For example, a managed care contract, a practice management company relationship, obtaining an electronic medical record from a software vendor, or hiring a billing company are all relationships where significant provider data will be at issue. In "Commerce in Provider Data: What, Why and Provider Contractual Controls" Daniel Shay looks at what is proprietary to a provider, considers who is reporting data and why, and offering actual contract language as well as case law, addresses contractual protections providers should think about in entering into relationships with a range of other entities.
One of the major thorns in the side of physicians confronting managed care payors has been their antitrust risk if they bargain for fees collectively. We have posited that ‘clinical integration’, which the antitrust regulators have said can permit otherwise collusive bargaining among competing physicians, is part of the business case for quality. In each of the physician and hospital network settlements in the last months, the FTC has noted that the physician groups were not sufficiently integrated financially or clinically. In the settlement with Brown and Toland, the FTC imposed a new requirement that if they chose to bargain based on clinical integration they would have to submit their approach to the FTC before implementation. Given the dearth of regulatory guidance on point, and only one advisory opinion to date, it is with great pleasure that we are able to make available an important article from our 2004 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK by Bob Leibenluft who was the head of the health care division of the FTC when the clinical integration opportunity was made available. In “Clinical Integration: Assessing the Antitrust Issues” Bob and his colleague Tracy Weir, acknowledge that the antitrust regulators have not seen much real clinical integration. We think that is probably true since much of what we are familiar with as purported to demonstrate clinical integration, in fact, does not go far enough. Still his article supports our case that doing what we suggest in our ‘unified field theory’ work would likely meet the regulators’ criteria.
Prosecutors are becoming increasingly interested in how quality implicates the fraud and abuse statutes. From understaffing in hospitals, to care which does not meet professionally recognized standards, to over-utilization, new theories of false claims and flat out fraud based on the clinical care rendered are emerging. Initially used to force some 40 or more false claims settlements around the country with nursing homes, prosecutors have now made it clear they intend to use similar theories to prosecute hospitals. In the current environment of diminishing reimbursement and heightened attention to quality, the fraud and abuse risks from less than optimal clinical behavior can no longer be ignored. Unless these issues are addressed in compliance programs, those initiatives will remain mired in the narrow focus of the administrative minutiae of billing problems, leaving the health care enterprise vulnerable and their compliance staff isolated from the principal focus of the organization – delivering high quality care.
At the same time, how to set priorities for compliance activities is beginning to stymie those compliance programs that addressed initial, low hanging fruit with corrective, voluntary actions. Some of our clients are struggling with where to go next. Many of them seem to believe that the role of compliance is to forever search out errors to report and repay. We do not share this view. We believe compliance is about doing it right in the first place and cleaning up problems found. It is not about eternal internal inspection. Our new AGG Note, “The Quality/Compliance Nexus: Moving to Programmatic Integration” examines the developing enforcement environment, sets forth liabilities already on the books, and then discusses how using clinical practice guidelines in compliance can integrate its import into the fundamental mission of health care. The result can be to (1) enhance compliance itself by making it meaningful for those from whom compliance is sought, (2) save time for the clinicians, and (3) actually improve quality on an on-going basis.
The need to advance a quality agenda in the American health care system has never been more urgent. Yet current initiatives, including "pay for performance" programs, are not generating desired improvement in health care. A major reason is the failure of policy, markets and regulation to engage physicians, arguably the most significant drivers of what care is delivered. On March 28, 2003 in Chicago, Alice G. Gosfield and James L. Reinertsen, MD, FACP, convened, with the generous support of Sanofi-Synthelabo, a unique meeting of 30 senior leaders (CEOs, CMOs, Senior VPs) from a variety of leading institutions around the country including Intermountain Health, Pacificare, Sutter, Scripps, Massachusetts General Hospital, CareGroup's Provider Service Network, HealthTexas (Baylor), Hackensack University Medical Center, Catholic Healthcare Partners, Mayo, EBM Solutions, Anthem, Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement, Oregon Health and Sciences University and others to consider, react to and develop further ideas first expounded in the AGG Note on 'Gosfield's Unified Field Theory'. This theory, which Reinertsen and Gosfield now seek to move to practice and application ("the Unified Field Theory-Applied ["UFT-A"]) posits how to use clinical practice guidelines to drive physician payment and many other aspects of the health care system. The purpose of such an approach is to (1) give physicians back more time to develop healing relationships with their patients; (2) improve quality; (3) standardize, simplify and make more clinically relevant the physician work environment; and (4) thereby make the entire health care system more consistent with overarching quality driven principles that speak to physicians the way they think.
The discussion was met with significant enthusiasm. Gosfield and Reinertsen have now written a white paper, "Doing Well by Doing Good: Improving the Business Case for Quality" which is available in both an Executive Summary as well as in the full version with footnotes and Appendices.Informed by the conference discussions, the paper considers
- Current barriers to a physician business case for quality,
- The limits of current attempts to address the business case,
- The centrality of physicians to the American health care system,
- Why physician time and touch with patients are essential quality problems,
- Five principles for change which could revolutionize health care,
- How clinical practice guidelines can provide a firm foundation for a unified system to reorder major aspects of health care delivery and accountability, not just for physicians but throughout health care; and
- Implementation challenges that will have to be addressed to make the theory real.
The goal of the paper is to stimulate rapid-fire trials in multiple venues. The conference attendees were interested in remaining in contact regarding initiatives, experiments and experiences with these ideas. We have now established a listserve at www.uft-a.com for those who seek to communicate in an on-going way on these issues. We are hopeful this will be the beginning for broader initiatives that will expand to others.
Health care report cards are a burgeoning phenomenon on the health care landscape. Comparative data on health plans, hospitals and physician groups are being published by increasingly diverse sources, on the Internet and otherwise. Customer/patient satisfaction data has dominated much of the field, but more and more, clinical quality comparisons are being offered. There are legal implications for the publishers of this data - whether third parties or self-reported. NCQA's HEDIS data is a major feature in the world of managed care. Although HEDIS data reports on managed care plans its power influences how plans relate to providers. Where a plan contracts with a physician group, for example, how that group will impact on their performance scores is a competitive issue with legal overtones for the physician group. We are helping clients understand the legal and strategic pitfalls and opportunities in responding to the comparative data demands of the new environment. (See our article, "Health Care Report Cards": Quality in the Public's Cross-Hairs.)